Related papers: The Shapley Value in Knapsack Budgeted Games
Cooperative game is a critical research area in the multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Global reward game is a subclass of cooperative games, where all agents aim to maximize the global reward. Credit assignment is an important…
Agentic workflows have become the dominant paradigm for building complex AI systems, orchestrating specialized components, such as planning, reasoning, action execution, and reflection, to tackle sophisticated real-world tasks. However,…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning is an area of rapid advancement in artificial intelligence and machine learning. One of the important questions to be answered is how to conduct credit assignment in a multi-agent system. There have been…
A number of techniques have been proposed to explain a machine learning model's prediction by attributing it to the corresponding input features. Popular among these are techniques that apply the Shapley value method from cooperative game…
We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…
Designing fair compensation mechanisms for demand response (DR) is challenging. This paper models the problem in a game theoretic setting and designs a payment distribution mechanism based on the Shapley Value. As exact computation of the…
In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…
Distributional data Shapley value (DShapley) has recently been proposed as a principled framework to quantify the contribution of individual datum in machine learning. DShapley develops the foundational game theory concept of Shapley values…
The Shapley value is a game-theoretic notion for wealth distribution that is nowadays extensively used to explain complex data-intensive computation, for instance, in network analysis or machine learning. Recent theoretical works show that…
Originally introduced in cooperative game theory, Shapley values have become a very popular tool to explain machine learning predictions. Based on Shapley's fairness axioms, every input (feature component) gets a credit how it contributes…
We study the Shapley value in weighted voting games. The Shapley value has been used as an index for measuring the power of individual agents in decision-making bodies and political organizations, where decisions are made by a majority vote…
One of the long-debated issues in coalitional game theory is how to extend the Shapley value to games with externalities (partition-function games). When externalities are present, not only can a player's marginal contribution - a central…
The Reward-Penalty-Selection Problem (RPSP) can be seen as a combination of the Set Cover Problem (SCP) and the Hitting Set Problem (HSP). Given a set of elements, a set of reward sets, and a set of penalty sets, one tries to find a subset…
In cooperative games, we study how values created or costs incurred by a coalition are shared among the members within it, and the players may join the coalition in a online manner such as investors invest a startup. Recently, Ge et al.…
Budget aggregation deals with the social choice problem of distributing an exogenously given budget among a set of public projects, given agents' preferences. Taking a game-theoretic perspective, we study budget-aggregation games where each…
Following the work of Lloyd Shapley on the Shapley value, and tangentially the work of Guillermo Owen, we offer an alternative non-probabilistic formulation of part of the work of Robert J. Weber in his 1978 paper "Probabilistic values for…
Big Boss Games represent a specific class of cooperative games where a single veto player, known as the Big Boss, plays a central role in determining resource allocation and maintaining coalition stability. In this paper, we introduce a…
A quantitative assessment of the global importance of an agent in a team is as valuable as gold for strategists, decision-makers, and sports coaches. Yet, retrieving this information is not trivial since in a cooperative task it is hard to…
Electing a committee of size k from m alternatives (k < m) is an interesting problem under the multi-winner voting rules. However, very few committee selection rules found in the literature consider the coalitional possibilities among the…
According to Shapley's game-theoretical result, there exists a unique game value of finite cooperative games that satisfies axioms on additivity, efficiency, null-player property and symmetry. The original setting requires symmetry with…