Related papers: Matching Dynamics with Constraints
Motivated by the increasing interest in the explicit representation and handling of various "preference" structures arising in modern digital economy, this work introduces a new class of "one-to-many stable-matching" problems where a set of…
We study popularity for matchings under preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that do not lose against any other matching in a majority vote by the agents. A popular matching is said to be robust if it is popular among…
Stochastic dynamic matching problems have recently gained attention in the stochastic-modeling community due to their diverse applications, such as supply-chain management and kidney exchange programs. In this paper, we study a matching…
In coalition formation games self-organized coalitions are created as a result of the strategic interactions of independent agents. For each couple of agents $(i,j)$, weight $w_{i,j}=w_{j,i}$ reflects how much agents $i$ and $j$ benefit…
We are given a bipartite graph $G = \left( A \cup B, E \right)$. In the one-sided model, every $a \in A$ (often called agents) ranks its neighbours $z \in N_{a}$ strictly, and no $b \in B$ has any preference order over its neighbours $y \in…
We formulate and study a general time-varying multi-agent system where players repeatedly compete under incomplete information. Our work is motivated by scenarios commonly observed in online advertising and retail marketplaces, where agents…
Toward explaining the persistence of biased inferences, we propose a framework to evaluate competing (mis)specifications in strategic settings. Agents with heterogeneous (mis)specifications coexist and draw Bayesian inferences about their…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
Evolutionary competition often occurs simultaneously at multiple levels of organization, in which traits or behaviors that are costly for an individual can provide collective benefits to groups to which the individual belongs. Building off…
If two species exhibit different nonlinear responses to a single shared resource, and if each species modifies the resource dynamics such that this favors its competitor, they may stably coexist. This coexistence mechanism, known as…
Evolutionary game theory has been successfully used to investigate the dynamics of systems, in which many entities have competitive interactions. From a physics point of view, it is interesting to study conditions under which a coordination…
In this paper, we study a variant of hedonic games, called \textsc{Seat Arrangement}. The model is defined by a bijection from agents with preferences for each other to vertices in a graph $G$. The utility of an agent depends on the…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
Federated learning is a distributed learning paradigm where multiple agents, each only with access to local data, jointly learn a global model. There has recently been an explosion of research aiming not only to improve the accuracy rates…
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…
We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as…
Federated learning is a setting where agents, each with access to their own data source, combine models from local data to create a global model. If agents are drawing their data from different distributions, though, federated learning…
We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can be generalized to supply chain networks viewed as $n$-sided…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
We consider coalition formation games in which each player has preferences over the other players and his preferences over coalitions are based on the best player ($\mathcal{B}$-/B-hedonic games) or the worst player ($\mathcal{W}$/W-hedonic…