Related papers: Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Partial Information…
Given a skew-symmetric matrix, the corresponding two-player symmetric zero-sum game is defined as follows: one player, the row player, chooses a row and the other player, the column player, chooses a column. The payoff of the row player is…
In the present work, we consider 2-person zero-sum stochastic differential games with a nonlinear pay-off functional which is defined through a backward stochastic differential equation. Our main objective is to study for such a game the…
Stochastic two-player games model systems with an environment that is both adversarial and stochastic. The adversarial part of the environment is modeled by a player (Player 2) who tries to prevent the system (Player 1) from achieving its…
We consider normal-form games with $n$ players and two strategies for each player, where the payoffs are i.i.d. random variables with some distribution $F$ and we consider issues related to the pure equilibria in the game as the number of…
This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a pair of randomised stopping times to form a saddle point of a zero-sum Dynkin game with partial and/or asymmetric information across players. The framework is non-Markovian and…
We study a zero-sum stochastic differential game (SDG) in which one controller plays an impulse control while their opponent plays a stochastic control. We consider an asymmetric setting in which the impulse player commits to, at the start…
We consider a finite state, finite action, zero-sum stochastic games with data defining the game lying in the ordered field of algebraic numbers. In both the discounted and the limiting average versions of these games we prove that the…
The paper is concerned with a zero-sum differential game in the case where a payoff is determined by the exit time, that is, the first time when the system leaves the game domain. Additionally, we assume that a part of domain's boundary is…
This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…
This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…
The purpose of this paper is to study 2-person zero-sum stochastic differential games, in which one player is a major one and the other player is a group of $N$ minor agents which are collectively playing, statistically identical and have…
We study $\lambda$-discounted zero-sum games as the discount factor $\lambda$ approaches $0$ (that is, the players are more and more patient), in the context of games with stage duration. In stochastic games with stage duration $h$, players…
We introduce and analyze a natural game formulated as follows. In this one-person game, the player is given a random permutation $A=(a_1,\dots, a_n)$ of a multiset $M$ of $n$ reals that sum up to $0$, where each of the $n!$ permutation…
Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…
In this paper, we solve the constant-payoff conjecture formulated by Sorin, Venel and Vigeral (2010), for absorbing games with an arbitrary evaluation of the stage rewards. That is, the existence of a pair of asymptotically optimal…
Matrix games constitute a fundamental problem of game theory and describe a situation of two players with completely conflicting interests. We show how methods from statistical mechanics can be used to investigate the statistical properties…
Zero-sum and non-zero-sum (aka general-sum) games are relevant in a wide range of applications. While general non-zero-sum games are computationally hard, researchers focus on the special class of monotone games for gradient-based…
A basic question for zero-sum repeated games consists in determining whether the mean payoff per time unit is independent of the initial state. In the special case of "zero-player" games, i.e., of Markov chains equipped with additive…
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…
This paper is concerned with mean field games in which the players do not know the repartition of the other players. First a case in which the players do not gain information is studied. Results of existence and uniqueness are proved and…