Related papers: Fast distributed almost stable marriages
The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…
Suppose $n$ boys and $n$ girls rank each other at random. We show that any particular girl has at least $({1\over 2}-\epsilon) \ln n$ and at most $(1+\epsilon)\ln n$ different husbands in the set of all Gale/Shapley stable matchings defined…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
We apply Lattice-Linear Predicate Detection Technique to derive parallel and distributed algorithms for various variants of the stable matching problem. These problems are: (a) the constrained stable marriage problem (b) the super stable…
The Stable Marriage problem (SM), solved by the famous deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (GS), has many natural generalizations. If we allow ties in preferences, then the problem of finding a maximum stable matching becomes…
We provide a problem definition of the stable marriage problem for a general number of parties $p$ under a natural preference scheme in which each person has simple lists for the other parties. We extend the notion of stability in a natural…
The dominating set problem has many practical applications but is well-known to be NP-hard. Therefore, there is a need for efficient approximation algorithms, especially in applications such as ad hoc wireless networks. Most distributed…
Consider the group of $n$ men and $n$ women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in…
We give a 3/2-approximation algorithm for stable matchings that runs in $O(m)$ time. The previously best known algorithm by McDermid has the same approximation ratio but runs in $O(n^{3/2}m)$ time, where $n$ denotes the number of people and…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
Assume that $n = 2k$ potential roommates each have an ordered preference of the $n-1$ others. A stable matching is a perfect matching of the $n$ roommates in which no two unmatched people prefer each other to their matched partners. In…
We show that many classical optimization problems --- such as $(1\pm\epsilon)$-approximate maximum flow, shortest path, and transshipment --- can be computed in $\newcommand{\tmix}{{\tau_{\text{mix}}}}\tmix(G)\cdot n^{o(1)}$ rounds of…
Fast distributed algorithms that output a feasible solution for constraint satisfaction problems, such as maximal independent sets, have been heavily studied. There has been much less research on distributed sampling problems, where one…
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…
In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of…
The paper investigates efficient distributed computation in dynamic networks in which the network topology changes (arbitrarily) from round to round. Our first contribution is a rigorous framework for design and analysis of distributed…
In the Gale-Shapley model of two-sided matching, it is well known that for generic preferences, the outcomes for each side can vary dramatically in the male-optimal vs. female-optimal stable matchings. In this paper, we show that under a…
In the stable marriage problem (SM), a mechanism that always outputs a stable matching is called a stable mechanism. One of the well-known stable mechanisms is the man-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm (MGS). MGS has a good property that it…
We study a discrete version of a geometric stable marriage problem originally proposed in a continuous setting by Hoffman, Holroyd, and Peres, in which points in the plane are stably matched to cluster centers, as prioritized by their…