Related papers: Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committ…
Approval-based committee (ABC) voting rules elect a fixed size subset of the candidates, a so-called committee, based on the voters' approval ballots over the candidates. While these rules have recently attracted significant attention,…
We introduces a general linear framework that unifies the study of multi-winner voting rules and proportionality axioms, demonstrating that many prominent multi-winner voting rules-including Thiele methods, their sequential variants, and…
We study proportional representation in the temporal voting model, where collective decisions are made repeatedly over time over a fixed horizon. Prior work has extensively investigated how proportional representation axioms from…
Approval-based committee selection is a model of significant interest in social choice theory. In this model, we have a set of voters $\mathcal{V}$, a set of candidates $\mathcal{C}$, and each voter has a set $A_v \subset \mathcal{C}$ of…
We prove axiomatic characterizations of several important multiwinner rules within the class of approval-based committee choice rules. These are voting rules that return a set of (fixed-size) committees. In particular, we provide axiomatic…
In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given election. Using synthetic elections coming from…
Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is used in elections for many political offices around the world. It allows voters to specify their preferences among candidates as a ranking. We identify a generalization of the rule, called Approval-IRV, that…
When selecting committees based on preferences of voters, a variety of different criteria can be considered. Two natural objectives are maximizing the utilitarian welfare (the sum of voters' utilities) and coverage (the number of…
In this paper, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviate and choose a committee of proportional size, so that all…
In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each…
In this paper we study several monotonicity axioms in approval-based multi-winner voting rules. We consider monotonicity with respect to the support received by the winners and also monotonicity in the size of the committee. Monotonicity…
In this paper we address the problem of electing a committee among a set of $m$ candidates and on the basis of the preferences of a set of $n$ voters. We consider the approval voting method in which each voter can approve as many candidates…
Assume $k$ candidates need to be selected. The candidates appear over time. Each time one appears, it must be immediately selected or rejected -- a decision that is made by a group of individuals through voting. Assume the voters use…
The study of fairness in multiwinner elections focuses on settings where candidates have attributes. However, voters may also be divided into predefined populations under one or more attributes (e.g., "California" and "Illinois" populations…
Committee scoring rules form a rich class of aggregators of voters' preferences for the purpose of selecting subsets of objects with desired properties, e.g., a shortlist of candidates for an interview, a representative collective body such…
A recent work by Hern\'andez et al. introduced a networked voting rule supported by a trust-based social network, where indications of possible representatives were based on individuals opinions. Individual contributions went beyond a…
In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on the voters' approval preferences over the candidates. While this problem has attracted significant attention in recent…
Consider a committee election consisting of (i) a set of candidates who are divided into arbitrary groups each of size ${at~most}$ two and a diversity constraint that stipulates the selection of ${at~least}$ one candidate from each group…
Selecting $k$ out of $m$ items based on the preferences of $n$ heterogeneous agents is a widely studied problem in algorithmic game theory. If agents have approval preferences over individual items and harmonic utility functions over…
Multiwinner Elections have emerged as a prominent area of research with numerous practical applications. We contribute to this area by designing parameterized approximation algorithms and also resolving an open question by Yang and Wang…