Related papers: Monotonic Preference Aggregation Mechanisms for Pu…
We study the problem of a buyer (aka auctioneer) who gains stochastic rewards by procuring multiple units of a service or item from a pool of heterogeneous strategic agents. The reward obtained for a single unit from an allocated agent…
In this paper, we study efficiency in truthful auctions via a social network, where a seller can only spread the information of an auction to the buyers through the buyers' network. In single-item auctions, we show that no mechanism is…
As distributed energy resources (DERs) proliferate, future power system will need new market platforms enabling prosumers to trade various electricity and grid-support products. However, prosumers often exhibit complex, product…
While consolidation strategies form the backbone of many supply chain optimisation problems, exploitation of multi-tier material relationships through consolidation remains an understudied area, despite being a prominent feature of…
The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (single minded bidders). This paper extends the current art by proposing an…
The participation of electric vehicle (EV) aggregators in real-time electricity markets offers promising revenue opportunities through price-responsive energy arbitrage. A central challenge in economic bidding lies in quantifying the…
We consider the question of whether collusion among bidders (a "bidding ring") can be supported in equilibrium of unrepeated first-price auctions. Unlike previous work on the topic such as that by McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Marshall and…
We present new conditions to obtain synchronization and consensus patterns in complex network systems. The key idea is to exploit symmetries of the nodes' vector fields to induce a desired synchronization/consensus pattern, where nodes are…
Mobile users in future wireless networks face limited wireless resources such as data plan, computation capacity and energy storage. Given that some of these users may not be utilizing fully their wireless resources, device-to-device (D2D)…
The proliferation of portable devices (PDAs, smartphones, digital multimedia players, and so forth) allows mobile users to carry around a pool of computing, storage and communication resources. Sharing these resources with other users…
Many spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed for spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving…
We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, denoted pick-an-object (PAO) mechanisms. When implementing an allocation rule via PAO, agents are asked to pick an object from individualized menus. These choices may…
In this paper, we introduce a Bayesian revenue-maximizing mechanism design model where the items have fixed, exogenously-given prices. Buyers are unit-demand and have an ordinal ranking over purchasing either one of these items at its given…
We study a budget-aggregation setting in which a number of voters report their ideal distribution of a budget over a set of alternatives, and a mechanism aggregates these reports into an allocation. Ideally, such mechanisms are truthful,…
We study the problem of fair online resource allocation via non-monetary mechanisms, where multiple agents repeatedly share a resource without monetary transfers. Previous work has shown that every agent can guarantee $1/2$ of their ideal…
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…
In traditional machine learning, the central server first collects the data owners' private data together and then trains the model. However, people's concerns about data privacy protection are dramatically increasing. The emerging paradigm…
This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…
In societal-scale infrastructures, such as electric grids or transportation networks, pricing mechanisms are often used as a way to shape users' demand in order to lower operating costs and improve reliability. Existing approaches to…
Participatory budgeting (PB) has been widely adopted and has attracted significant research efforts; however, there is a lack of mechanisms for PB which elicit project interactions, such as substitution and complementarity, from voters.…