Related papers: Monotonic Preference Aggregation Mechanisms for Pu…
Multi-item revenue-optimal mechanisms are known to be extremely complex, often offering buyers randomized lotteries of goods. In the standard buy-one model, it is known that optimal mechanisms can yield revenue infinitely higher than that…
This paper concerns the mechanism design for online resource allocation in a strategic setting. In this setting, a single supplier allocates capacity-limited resources to requests that arrive in a sequential and arbitrary manner. Each…
This note pursues two primary objectives. First, we analyze the outcomes of an all-pay auction within a store where buyers with and without financial constraints arrive at varying rates, and where buyer types are private information.…
We consider allocation of a resource to multiple interested users with a constraint that if the resource is allocated to user $i$ then it can not be allocated simultaneously to a predefined set of users $\cS_i$ . This scenario arises in…
We study a mechanism design problem where a seller aims to allocate a good to multiple bidders, each with a private value. The seller supports or favors a specific group, referred to as the minority group. Specifically, the seller requires…
Diffusion auction is a new model in auction design. It can incentivize the buyers who have already joined in the auction to further diffuse the sale information to others via social relations, whereby both the seller's revenue and the…
We consider a mechanism design problem for energy procurement, when there is one buyer and one seller, and the buyer is the mechanism designer. The seller can generate energy from conventional (deterministic) and renewable (random) plants,…
We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model for public expenditure without an exogenously available…
The buying and selling of information is taking place at a scale unprecedented in the history of commerce, thanks to the formation of online marketplaces for user data. Data providing agencies sell user information to advertisers to allow…
We consider two small cell operators deployed in the same geographical area, sharing spectrum resources from a common pool. A method is investigated to coordinate the utilization of the spectrum pool without monetary transactions and…
In this paper we study the so-called minimum income condition order, which is used in some day-ahead electricity power exchanges to represent the production-related costs of generating units. This order belongs to the family of complex…
Agents care not only about the outcomes of collective decisions but also about how decisions are made. In many cases, both the outcome and the procedure affect whether agents see a decision as legitimate, justifiable, or acceptable. We…
Ads on the Internet are increasingly sold via ad exchanges such as RightMedia, AdECN and Doubleclick Ad Exchange. These exchanges allow real-time bidding, that is, each time the publisher contacts the exchange, the exchange ``calls out'' to…
This research proposes a novel auction mechanism for transactive energy exchange between buyers and sellers, modeled as agents in a microgrid. The mechanism is implemented by a separate microgrid controller (MC) agent, and requires big data…
A seller is selling a pair of divisible complementary goods to an agent. The agent consumes the goods only in a specific ratio and freely disposes of excess in either goods. The value of the bundle and the ratio are private information of…
We investigate revenue maximization problems in auctions for dynamic spectrum access. We consider the frequency division and spread spectrum methods of dynamic spectrum sharing. In the frequency division method, a primary spectrum user…
Emerging methods for participatory algorithm design have proposed collecting and aggregating individual stakeholder preferences to create algorithmic systems that account for those stakeholders' values. Using algorithmic student assignment…
Applications such as employees sharing office spaces over a workweek can be modeled as problems where agents are matched to resources over multiple rounds. Agents' requirements limit the set of compatible resources and the rounds in which…
I construct a novel random double auction as a robust bilateral trading mechanism for a profit-maximizing intermediary who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. It works as follows. The intermediary publicly commits to charging a…
In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…