Related papers: Approachability in Population Games
We investigate how the framework of mean-field games may be used to investigate strategic interactions in large heterogeneous populations. We consider strategic interactions in a population of players which may be partitioned into…
We analyze the stability of a nonlinear dynamical model describing the noncooperative strategic interactions among the agents of a finite collection of populations. Each agent selects one strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly…
In many real-world large-scale decision problems, self-interested agents have individual dynamics and optimize their own long-term payoffs. Important examples include the competitive access to shared resources (e.g., roads, energy, or…
The accumulation of individual fitness or wealth is modelled as a population game in which pairs of individuals are recurrently and randomly matched to play a game over a resource. In addition, all individuals have random access to a…
We study a simple adaptive model in the framework of an N -player normal form game. The model consists of a repeated game where the players only know their own action space and their own payoff scored at each stage, not those of the other…
Games on graphs provide a natural and powerful model for reactive systems. In this paper, we consider generalized reachability objectives, defined as conjunctions of reachability objectives. We first prove that deciding the winner in such…
The mean field games (MFG) paradigm was introduced to provide tractable approximations of games involving very large populations. The theory typically rests on two key assumptions: homogeneity, meaning that all players share the same…
The notion of approachability was introduced by Blackwell [1] in the context of vector-valued repeated games. The famous Blackwell's approachability theorem prescribes a strategy for approachability, i.e., for `steering' the average cost of…
In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…
Mean field games are concerned with the limit of large-population stochastic differential games where the agents interact through their empirical distribution. In the classical setting, the number of players is large but fixed throughout…
Purpose: We propose a model to present a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioural structures by simulating an agent based on the evolutionary public good game with available social learning. Methods: The model considered a…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…
In this paper, we present a model of a game among teams. Each team consists of a homogeneous population of agents. Agents within a team are cooperative while the teams compete with other teams. The dynamics and the costs are coupled through…
We study the population genetics of Evolution in the important special case of weak selection, in which all fitness values are assumed to be close to one another. We show that in this regime natural selection is tantamount to the…
This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…
We consider evolutionary games on a population whose underlying topology of interactions is determined by a binomial random graph $G(n,p)$. Our focus is on 2-player symmetric games with 2 strategies played between the incident members of…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…
Bertrand et al. [1] (LMCS 2019) describe two-player zero-sum games in which one player tries to achieve a reachability objective in $n$ games (on the same finite arena) simultaneously by broadcasting actions, and where the opponent has full…