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Rational verification refers to the problem of checking which temporal logic properties hold of a concurrent multiagent system, under the assumption that agents in the system choose strategies that form a game-theoretic equilibrium.…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
Sustainable resource use in large societies requires social institutions that specify acceptable behavior and punish violators. Because mutual monitoring becomes prohibitively costly as populations grow, we examine whether sustainability…
In this paper, we propose a novel approach for verifying the compliance of turn-based multi-agent reinforcement learning (TMARL) agents with complex requirements in stochastic multiplayer games. Our method overcomes the limitations of…
It is well known that the verification of resource-constrained multiagent systems is undecidable in general. In many such settings, resources are private to agents. In this paper, we investigate the model checking problem for a resource…
We study the strategic aspects of social influence in a society of agents linked by a trust network, introducing a new class of games called games of influence. A game of influence is an infinite repeated game with incomplete information in…
Effective enforcement of laws and policies requires expending resources to prevent and detect offenders, as well as appropriate punishment schemes to deter violators. In particular, enforcement of privacy laws and policies in modern…
In this paper, we analyze timed systems with data structures, using a rich interplay of logic and properties of graphs. We start by describing behaviors of timed systems using graphs with timing constraints. Such a graph is called…
Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…
Real-time cybersecurity and privacy applications require reliable verification methods and system design tools to ensure their correctness. Many of these reactive real-time applications embedded in various infrastructures, such as airports,…
Inspired by Martin Fr\"anzle's persistent and influential work on capturing and handling delay inherent to cyber-physical systems in the formal verification of such systems, we study timed games where controllable actions do not take effect…
In this paper we survey various notions of anonymity and symmetry for finite strategic-form games present in relevant literature, and discuss notions of fairness; show that game bijections and game isomorphisms form groupoids; introduce…
Imitation is simple behavior which uses successful actions of others in order to deal with one's own problems. Because success of imitation generally depends on whether profit of an imitating agent coincides with those of other agents or…
Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have extended their capabilities from basic text processing to complex reasoning tasks, including legal interpretation, argumentation, and strategic interaction. However, empirical…
Many types of attacks on confidentiality stem from the nondeterministic nature of the environment that computer programs operate in (e.g., schedulers and asynchronous communication channels). In this paper, we focus on verification of…
In large systems, it is important for agents to learn to act effectively, but sophisticated multi-agent learning algorithms generally do not scale. An alternative approach is to find restricted classes of games where simple, efficient…
Reasoning about strategic abilities is key to AI systems comprising multiple agents, which provide a unified framework for formalizing various problems in game theory, social choice theory, etc. In this work, we propose a probabilistic…
This paper develops a unified framework for testing monotonicity of Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies in unobserved types in games of incomplete information. We show that, under symmetric independent private types, monotonicity of…
We propose enhancing the use of propositions for denoting decisions and strategies as established in temporal languages such as CTL*, if interpreted on concurrent game models. The enhancement enables specifying varying coalition structure.…
Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced in arXiv:1307.2145, arXiv:1403.4958. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given…