Related papers: Election Attacks with Few Candidates
We characterize the optimal reward functions (scoring rules) that incentivize an agent to acquire information and report it truthfully to the principal. The optimal scoring rules let the agent make a simple binary bet in single-dimensional…
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences…
In real-world elections where voters cast preference ballots, voters often provide only a partial ranking of the candidates. Despite this empirical reality, prior social choice literature frequently analyzes fairness criteria under the…
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-theory, social science and recently computational approaches are all applied in order to model the incentives and behavior of voters. In a…
May's classical theorem states that in a single-winner choose-one voting system with just two candidates, majority rule is the only social choice function satisfying anonimity, neutrality and positive responsiveness axiom. Anonimity and…
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show…
The standard voting methods in the United States, plurality and ranked choice (or instant runoff) voting, are susceptible to significant voting failures. These flaws include Condorcet and majority failures as well as monotonicity and…
Multi-winner approval-based voting has received considerable attention recently. A voting rule in this setting takes as input ballots in which each agent approves a subset of the available alternatives and outputs a committee of…
Resource allocation problems across multiple contests are ubiquitous in adversarial settings, from military operations to market competition. While Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games have provided valuable theoretical foundations for…
We consider two matrix completion problems, in which we are given a matrix with missing entries and the task is to complete the matrix in a way that (1) minimizes the rank, or (2) minimizes the number of distinct rows. We study the…
Several elections run in the last years have been characterized by attempts to manipulate the result of the election through the diffusion of fake or malicious news over social networks. This problem has been recognized as a critical issue…
The knapsack problem (KP) is a very famous NP-hard problem in combinatorial optimization. Also its generalization to multiple dimensions named d-dimensional knapsack problem (d-KP) and to multiple knapsacks named multiple knapsack problem…
The Possible Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the candidates are specified only partially, whether a designated candidate can become a winner by suitably extending all the votes. Betzler and Dorn [1]…
We consider the problem of predicting winners in elections, for the case where we are given complete knowledge about all possible candidates, all possible voters (together with their preferences), but where it is uncertain either which…
Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) adoption is expanding across U.S. elections, but faces persistent criticism for complexity, strategic manipulation, and ballot exhaustion. We empirically test these concerns on real election data, across three…
Strategic voting, or manipulation, is the process by which a voter misrepresents his preferences in an attempt to elect an outcome that he considers preferable to the outcome under sincere voting. It is generally agreed that manipulation is…
Targeted marketing policies target different customers with different marketing actions. While most research has focused on training targeting policies without managerial constraints, in practice, many firms face managerial constraints when…
We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [Electoral Studies, 25(2):287-305, 2006], and here adjusted so as to coerce admissibility of the votes (rather than excluding…
An election is defined as a pair of a set of candidates C=\{c_1,\cdots,c_m\} and a multiset of votes V=\{v_1,\cdots,v_n\}, where each vote is a linear order of the candidates. The Borda election rule is characterized by a vector \langle…
Approval-based committee (ABC) voting rules elect a fixed size subset of the candidates, a so-called committee, based on the voters' approval ballots over the candidates. While these rules have recently attracted significant attention,…