Related papers: An Ordinal Bargaining Solution with Fixed-Point Pr…

We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…

We study bargaining games between suppliers and manufacturers in a network context. Agents wish to enter into contracts in order to generate surplus which then must be divided among the participants. Potential contracts and their surplus…

In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.…

We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…

We consider preference communication in two-player multi-objective normal-form games. In such games, the payoffs resulting from joint actions are vector-valued. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume there exists a utility function for…

A double auction game with an infinite number of buyers and sellers is introduced. All sellers posses one unit of a good, all buyers desire to buy one unit. Each seller and each buyer has a private valuation of the good. The distribution of…

Principal-agent problems arise when one party acts on behalf of another, leading to conflicts of interest. The economic literature has extensively studied principal-agent problems, and recent work has extended this to more complex scenarios…

In the stable marriage and roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having a strictly ordered preference list over some or all of the other agents. A matching is a set of disjoint pairs of mutually accepted agents. If any…

Small operators who take part in secondary wireless spectrum markets typically have strict budget limits. In this paper, we study the bidding problem of a budget constrained operator in repeated secondary spectrum auctions. In existing…

The Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple model that captures the essential contradiction between individual rationality and global rationality. Although the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma is usually viewed simple, in this paper we will categorize it…

Logic programming with fixed-point definitions is a useful extension of traditional logic programming. Fixed-point definitions can capture simple model checking problems and closed-world assumptions. Its operational semantics is typically…

In this paper we provide a first-ever epistemic formulation of stabilizing agreement, defined as the non-terminating variant of the well established consensus problem. In stabilizing agreements, agents are given (possibly different) initial…

Hedonic games are an archetypal problem in coalition formation, where a set of selfish agents want to partition themselves into stable coalitions. In this work, we focus on two natural constraints on the possible outcomes. First, we require…

Bargaining can be used to resolve mixed-motive games in multi-agent systems. Although there is an abundance of negotiation strategies implemented in automated negotiating agents, most agents are based on single fixed strategies, while it is…

We consider the problem of social choice when transfers between agents are possible. This includes several canonical applications: public-good provision, management of a common resource, settlement of debts, and division of goods. The…

We study procurement games where each seller supplies multiple units of his item, with a cost per unit known only to him. The buyer can purchase any number of units from each seller, values different combinations of the items differently,…

We study the classical problem of matching $n$ agents to $n$ objects, where the agents have ranked preferences over the objects. We focus on two popular desiderata from the matching literature: Pareto optimality and rank-maximality. Instead…

We consider ordinal online problems, i.e., tasks that only require pairwise comparisons between elements of the input. A classic example is the secretary problem and the game of googol, as well as its multiple combinatorial extensions such…

Given a dynamic ordinal game, we deem a strategy sequentially rational if there exist a Bernoulli utility function and a conditional probability system with respect to which the strategy is a maximizer. We establish a complete class theorem…

In the Seat Arrangement problem the goal is to allocate agents to vertices in a graph such that the resulting arrangement is optimal or fair in some way. Examples include an arrangement that maximises utility or one where no agent envies…