Related papers: Ergodicity conditions for zero-sum games

In reinforcement learning, we typically aim to optimize the expected value of the sum of rewards an agent collects over a trajectory. However, if the process generating these rewards is non-ergodic, the expected value, i.e., the average…

In this paper, we consider both finite and infinite horizon discounted dynamic mean-field games where there is a large population of homogeneous players sequentially making strategic decisions and each player is affected by other players…

In the online prediction framework, we use generalized entropy of to study the loss rate of predictors when outcomes are drawn according to stationary ergodic distributions over the binary alphabet. We show that the notion of generalized…

It has been established under very general conditions that the ergodic properties of Markov processes are inherited by their conditional distributions given partial information. While the existing theory provides a rather complete picture…

In the paper we present a model of discrete-time mean-field game with several populations of players. Mean-field games with multiple populations of the players have only been studied in the literature in the continuous-time setting. The…

A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player's information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain…

This paper is a survey of various proofs of the so called {\em fundamental theorem of Markov chains}: every ergodic Markov chain has a unique positive stationary distribution and the chain attains this distribution in the limit independent…

In this paper we consider non zero-sum games where multiple players control the drift of a process, and their payoffs depend on its ergodic behaviour. We establish their connection with systems of Ergodic BSDEs, and prove the existence of a…

We consider a zero sum differential game with lack of observation on one side. The initial state of the system is drawn at random according to some probability $\mu_0$ on $\R^N$. Player-I is informed of the initial position of state while…

In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…

In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…

Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…

We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…

It is known that a gambler repeating a game with positive expected value has a positive probability to never go broke. We use the mass transport method to prove the generalization of this fact where the gains from the bets form a…

This paper considers a class of reinforcement-based learning (namely, perturbed learning automata) and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in repeatedly-played, positive-utility, finite strategic-form games. Prior work in this class of…

We consider a mean-field game model where the cost functions depend on a fixed parameter, called \textit{state}, which is unknown to players. Players learn about the state from a a stream of private signals they receive throughout the game.…

This paper is an attempt to compute the value and saddle points of zero-sum risk-sensitive average stochastic games. For the average games with finite states and actions, we first introduce the so-called irreducibility coefficient and then…

We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…

Graph games provide the foundation for modeling and synthesizing reactive processes. In the synthesis of stochastic reactive processes, the traditional model is perfect-information stochastic games, where some transitions of the game graph…

The famous theorem of R.Aumann and M.Maschler states that the sequence of values of an N-stage zero-sum game G_N with incomplete information on one side converges as N tends to infinity, and the error term is bounded by a constant divided…