Related papers: Ergodicity conditions for zero-sum games

We consider a zero-sum continuous time stopping game in which the pay-off is revealed in the maximum of the two stopping times instead of the minimum, which is the case in Dynkin games.

In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix…

Zero sum games with risk-sensitive cost criterion are considered with underlying dynamics being given by controlled stochastic differential equations. Under the assumption of geometric stability on the dynamics , we completely characterize…

We consider a stochastic differential equation that is controlled by means of an additive finite-variation process. A singular stochastic controller, who is a minimizer, determines this finite-variation process, while a discretionary…

We consider concurrent mean-payoff games, a very well-studied class of two-player (player 1 vs player 2) zero-sum games on finite-state graphs where every transition is assigned a reward between 0 and 1, and the payoff function is the…

We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, equivalent to two independent $M/M/1$ queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the…

We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…

We analyze undiscounted continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits. The risky arm generates payoffs according to a L\'{e}vy process with an unknown average payoff per unit of time which nature draws from an…

We study a finite-horizon two-person zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic game for continuous-time Markov chains and Borel state and action spaces, in which payoff rates, transition rates and terminal reward functions are allowed to be…

In this paper, we establish the existence and uniqueness of weak solutions to first-order discount mean field games and a stability result to give the existence for the ergodic problem. We show an example to illustrate the multiplicity of…

This paper investigates the well-posedness of a type of state constraint ergodic Mean Field Game system in a bounded domain in which the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is paired with an infinite Dirichlet boundary condition. In this…

We study the set of (stationary) feasible payoffs of overlapping generation repeated games that can be achieved by action sequences in which every generation of players plays the same sequence of action profiles. First, we completely…

Recently, Sidford, Wang, Wu and Ye (2018) developed an algorithm combining variance reduction techniques with value iteration to solve discounted Markov decision processes. This algorithm has a sublinear complexity when the discount factor…

This paper studies a type of rank-based mean field game in which competing agents strategically switch among multiple effort regimes. We propose an entropy regularized auxiliary problem where the switching decisions are randomized to the…

We consider a two-player game of war of attrition under complete information. It is well-known that this class of games admits equilibria in pure, as well as mixed strategies, and much of the literature has focused on the latter. We show…

The long-run average payoff per transition (mean payoff) is the main tool for specifying the performance and dependability properties of discrete systems. The problem of constructing a controller (strategy) simultaneously optimizing several…

We are interested in the convergence of the value of n-stage games as n goes to infinity and the existence of the uniform value in stochastic games with a general set of states and finite sets of actions where the transition is commutative.…

Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…

This paper considers the discounted criterion of nonzero-sum decentralized stochastic games with prospect players. The state and action spaces are finite. The state transition probability is nonstationary. Each player independently controls…

We study a simple adaptive model in the framework of an N -player normal form game. The model consists of a repeated game where the players only know their own action space and their own payoff scored at each stage, not those of the other…