Related papers: Ergodicity conditions for zero-sum games
Zero-sum stochastic games generalize the notion of Markov Decision Processes (i.e. controlled Markov chains, or stochastic dynamic programming) to the 2-player competitive case : two players jointly control the evolution of a state…
Mean field games model equilibria in games with a continuum of players as limiting systems of symmetric $n$-player games with weak interaction between the players. We consider a finite-state, infinite-horizon problem with two cost criteria:…
Mean-payoff zero-sum stochastic games can be studied by means of a nonlinear spectral problem. When the state space is finite, the latter consists in finding an eigenpair $(u,\lambda)$ solution of $T(u)=\lambda e + u$, where $T:\mathbb{R}^n…
We study nonzero-sum stochastic games for continuous time Markov chains on a denumerable state space with risk sensitive discounted and ergodic cost criteria. For the discounted cost criterion we first show that the corresponding system of…
The infinite horizon risk-sensitive discounted-cost and ergodic-cost nonzero-sum stochastic games for controlled Markov chains with countably many states are analyzed. For the discounted-cost game, we prove the existence of Nash equilibrium…
In \emph{zero-sum two-player hidden stochastic games}, players observe partial information about the state. We address: $(i)$ the existence of the \emph{uniform value}, i.e., a limiting average payoff that both players can guarantee for…
Cooperation in heterogeneous groups, where individuals differ in resources, productivity, and behavioural responsiveness, underpins collective action across many social and biological systems. Introspection dynamics, in which each player…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
We suggest a new algorithm for two-person zero-sum undiscounted stochastic games focusing on stationary strategies. Given a positive real $\epsilon$, let us call a stochastic game $\epsilon$-ergodic, if its values from any two initial…
The paper is concerned with a variant of the continuous-time finite state Markov game of control and stopping where both players can affect transition rates, while only one player can choose a stopping time. We use the dynamic programming…
The paper is concerned with a zero-sum continuous-time stochastic differential game with a dynamics controlled by a Markov process and a terminal payoff. The value function of the original game is estimated using the value function of a…
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces, perfect information, mean payoff criteria, without any irreducibility assumption on the Markov chains associated to strategies (multichain games). The value of such…
Definable zero-sum stochastic games involve a finite number of states and action sets, reward and transition functions that are definable in an o-minimal structure. Prominent examples of such games are finite, semi-algebraic or globally…
This paper deals with N-person nonzero-sum discrete-time Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the transition probabilities and reward functions are allowed to vary with time. Differing from the existing works on the expected…
We study zero-sum stochastic games for controlled discrete time Markov chains with risk-sensitive average cost criterion with countable state space and Borel action spaces. The payoff function is nonnegative and possibly unbounded. Under a…
Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state two-player zero-sum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards.…
We consider 2-player zero-sum stochastic games where each player controls his own state variable living in a compact metric space. The terminology comes from gambling problems where the state of a player represents its wealth in a casino.…
In a mean field game of controls, players seek to minimize a cost that depends on the joint distribution of players' states and controls. We consider an ergodic problem for second-order mean field games of controls with state constraints,…
We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium…
Two-player zero-sum repeated games are well understood. Computing the value of such a game is straightforward. Additionally, if the payoffs are dependent on a random state of the game known to one, both, or neither of the players, the…