Related papers: Quality Sensitive Price Competition in Spectrum Ol…
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…
Data heterogeneity across multiple sources is common in real-world machine learning (ML) settings. Although many methods focus on enabling a single model to handle diverse data, real-world markets often comprise multiple competing ML…
In this paper, we address the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in non-cooperative convex games with partial-decision information. We propose a distributed algorithm, where each agent refines its strategy through projected-gradient…
We consider pricing and selection with fading channels in a Stackelberg game framework. A channel server decides the channel prices and a client chooses which channel to use based on the remote estimation quality. We prove the existence of…
In this paper, we investigate cost-aware joint learning and optimization for multi-channel opportunistic spectrum access in a cognitive radio system. We investigate a discrete time model where the time axis is partitioned into frames. Each…
We consider a situation where wireless service providers compete for heterogenous wireless users. The users differ in their willingness to pay as well as in their individual channel gains. We prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash…
We study the computational complexity of strategic behaviour in primary elections. Unlike direct voting systems, primaries introduce a multi-stage process in which voters first influence intra-party nominees before a general election…
We consider a wireless channel shared by multiple transmitter-receiver pairs. Their transmissions interfere with each other. Each transmitter-receiver pair aims to maximize its long-term average transmission rate subject to an average power…
We consider a package assignment problem with multiple units of indivisible items. The seller can specify preferences over partitions of their supply between buyers as packaging costs. We propose incremental costs together with a graph that…
We study a setting in which a data buyer seeks to estimate an unknown parameter by purchasing samples from one of K data sellers. Each seller has privately known data quality (e.g., high vs. low variance) and a private per-sample cost. We…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
We study a game between two firms in which each provide a service based on machine learning. The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their…
In the Binary Networked Public Goods game, every player needs to decide if she participates in a public project whose utility is shared equally by the community. We study the problem of deciding if there exists a pure strategy Nash…
This paper considers coverage games in which a group of agents are tasked with identifying the highest-value subset of resources; in this context, game-theoretic approaches are known to yield Nash equilibria within a factor of 2 of optimal.…
First price auctions are widely used in government contracts and industrial auctions. In this paper, we consider the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in first price auctions with discrete value distributions. We study the characterization of…
In the digital age, resources such as open-source software and publicly accessible databases form a crucial category of digital public goods, providing extensive benefits for Internet. This paper investigates networked public goods games…
With a multilateral vertical contracting model of media markets, we examine upstream competition and contractual arrangements in content provision. We analyze the trade of content by the Nash bargaining solution and the downstream…
In this paper we study a game where every player is to choose a vertex (facility) in a given undirected graph. All vertices (customers) are then assigned to closest facilities and a player's payoff is the number of customers assigned to it.…
Pharmaceutical markets for life-saving therapies combine monopoly power with insurance coverage. We build a tractable sequential game in which a patent-holder chooses the drug price, a profit-maximising insurer sets its premium, and a…
This paper considers a class of noncooperative games in which the feasible decision sets of all players are coupled together by a coupled inequality constraint. Adopting the variational inequality formulation of the game, we first introduce…