Related papers: Countermeasures against Bernstein's remote cache t…
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmetric key encryption algorithm which is extensively used in secure electronic data transmission. When introduced, although it was tested and declared as secure, in 2005, a researcher named…
Rijndael was standardized in 2001 by National Institute of Standard and Technology as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). AES is still being used to encrypt financial, military and even government confidential data. In 2005, Bernstein…
Rijndael algorithm was unanimously chosen as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by the panel of researchers at National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in October 2000. Since then, Rijndael was destined to be used massively…
Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…
Microarchitectural side channel attacks have been very prominent in security research over the last few years. Caches have been an outstanding covert channel, as they provide high resolution and generic cross-core leakage even with simple…
Cache timing attacks use shared caches in multi-core processors as side channels to extract information from victim processes. These attacks are particularly dangerous in cloud infrastructures, in which the deployed countermeasures cause…
Side channel attacks are a major class of attacks to crypto-systems. Attackers collect and analyze timing behavior, I/O data, or power consumption in these systems to undermine their effectiveness in protecting sensitive information. In…
Caches have been exploited to leak secret information due to the different times they take to handle memory accesses. Cache timing attacks include non-speculative cache side and covert channel attacks and cache-based speculative execution…
Cache attacks exploit memory access patterns of cryptographic implementations. Constant-Time implementation techniques have become an indispensable tool in fighting cache timing attacks. These techniques engineer the memory accesses of…
CPU caches introduce variations into the execution time of programs that can be exploited by adversaries to recover private information about users or cryptographic keys. Establishing the security of countermeasures against this threat…
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm is considered as a secured algorithm. Still, some security issues lie in the S-Box and the key used. In this paper, we have tried to give focus on the security of the key used. Here, the proposed…
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide an environment for running workloads in the cloud without having to trust cloud service providers, by offering additional hardware-assisted security guarantees. However, main memory encryption…
Modern computer processors use microarchitectural optimization mechanisms to improve performance. As a downside, such optimizations are prone to introducing side-channel vulnerabilities. Speculative loading of memory, called prefetching, is…
Timing side channels have been used to extract cryptographic keys and sensitive documents, even from trusted enclaves. In this paper, we focus on cache side channels created by access to shared code or data in the memory hierarchy. This…
Caches are used to reduce the speed differential between the CPU and memory to improve the performance of modern processors. However, attackers can use contention-based cache timing attacks to steal sensitive information from victim…
Modern processors dynamically control their operating frequency to optimize resource utilization, maximize energy savings, and conform to system-defined constraints. If, during the execution of a software workload, the running average of…
We present a new hardware-agnostic side-channel attack that targets one of the most fundamental software caches in modern computer systems: the operating system page cache. The page cache is a pure software cache that contains all…
Recent studies highlighting the vulnerability of computer architecture to information leakage attacks have been a cause of significant concern. Among the various classes of microarchitectural attacks, cache timing channels are especially…
Cache side channel attacks are increasingly alarming in modern processors due to the recent emergence of Spectre and Meltdown attacks. A typical attack performs intentional cache access and manipulates cache states to leak secrets by…
For a distributed last-level cache (LLC) in a large multicore chip, the access time to one LLC bank can significantly differ from that to another due to the difference in physical distance. In this paper, we successfully demonstrated a new…