Related papers: Countermeasures against Bernstein's remote cache t…

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is widely recognized as the most important block cipher in common use nowadays. This high assurance in AES is given by its resistance to ten years of extensive cryptanalysis, that has shown no…

Besides cryptographic secrets, side-channel attacks also leak sensitive user input. The most accurate attacks exploit cache timings or interrupt information to monitor keystroke timings and subsequently infer typed words and sentences.…

This work presents a new tool to verify the correctness of cryptographic implementations with respect to cache attacks. Our methodology discovers vulnerabilities that are hard to find with other techniques, observed as exploitable leakage.…

Hardware caches are essential performance optimization features in modern processors to reduce the effective memory access time. Unfortunately, they are also the prime targets for attacks on computer processors because they are…

Timing-based side or covert channels in processor caches continue to present a threat to computer systems, and they are the key to many of the recent Spectre and Meltdown attacks. Based on improvements to an existing three-step model for…

In cache-based side channel attacks, an attacker infers information about the victim based on the presence, or lack thereof, of one or more cachelines. Determining a cacheline's presence, which we refer to as "reading the signal", typically…

Cache randomization has recently been revived as a promising defense against conflict-based cache side-channel attacks. As two of the latest implementations, CEASER-S and ScatterCache both claim to thwart conflict-based cache side-channel…

GPUs are increasingly being used in security applications, especially for accelerating encryption/decryption. While GPUs are an attractive platform in terms of performance, the security of these devices raises a number of concerns. One…

Timing-based side and covert channels in processor caches continue to be a threat to modern computers. This work shows for the first time a systematic, large-scale analysis of Arm devices and the detailed results of attacks the processors…

Cache timing attacks allow third-party observers to retrieve sensitive information from program executions. But, is it possible to automatically check the vulnerability of a program against cache timing attacks and then, automatically…

Real-time cyber-physical systems depend on deterministic task execution to guarantee safety and correctness. Unfortunately, this determinism can unintentionally expose timing information that enables adversaries to infer task execution…

In this paper we introduced countermeasures against side-channel attacks in the shared memory of TrustZone. We proposed zero-contention cache memory or policy between REE and TEE to prevent from TruSpy attacks in TrustZone. And we suggested…

Cache attacks pose a threat to any code whose execution flow or memory accesses depend on sensitive information. Especially in public clouds, where caches are shared across several tenants, cache attacks remain an unsolved problem. Cache…

Randomizing the address-to-set mapping and partitioning of the cache has been shown to be an effective mechanism in designing secured caches. Several designs have been proposed on a variety of rationales: (1) randomized design, (2)…

In this paper, we show that the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptosystem can be used as an error-correcting code to obtain reliability over noisy communication and data systems. Moreover, we characterize a family of computational…

Timing channels are a significant and growing security threat in computer systems, with no established solution. We have recently argued that the OS must provide time protection, in analogy to the established memory protection, to protect…

Numerous previous works have studied deep learning algorithms applied in the context of side-channel attacks, which demonstrated the ability to perform successful key recoveries. These studies show that modern cryptographic devices are…

Side-channel attacks on memory (SCAM) exploit unintended data leaks from memory subsystems to infer sensitive information, posing significant threats to system security. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities in memory access patterns, cache…

Quantum computers create new security risks for today's encryption systems. This paper presents an improved version of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) that uses quantum technology to strengthen protection. Our approach offers two…

The last level cache is vulnerable to timing based side channel attacks because it is shared by the attacker and the victim processes even if they are located on different cores. These timing attacks evict the victim cache lines using small…