Related papers: Self-stabilizing uncoupled dynamics
A class of nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games with imperfect information structure is investigated. The game involves an arbitrary number of players, modeled as homogeneous Markov decision processes, aiming to find a sequential Nash…
We study delay-independent stability in nonlinear models with a distributed delay which have a positive equilibrium. Such models frequently occur in population dynamics and other applications. In particular, we construct a relevant…
Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…
From a mathematical point of view self-organization can be described as patterns to which certain dynamical systems modeling social dynamics tend spontaneously to be attracted. In this paper we explore situations beyond self-organization,…
We consider large but finite systems of identical agents on the line with up to next nearest neighbor asymmetric coupling. Each agent is modelled by a linear second order differential equation, linearly coupled to up to four of its…
Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less…
In this paper, we examine the robustness of Nash equilibria in continuous games, under both strategic and dynamic uncertainty. Starting with the former, we introduce the notion of a robust equilibrium as those equilibria that remain…
We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…
Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around their optimum, i.e., Nash equilibrium. When a game…
This work explores dynamics existing in interactions between players. The dynamic system of games is a new attitude to modeling in which an event is modeled using several games. The model allows us to analyze the interplay capabilities and…
This article is concerned with stability analysis and stabilization of randomly switched nonlinear systems. These systems may be regarded as piecewise deterministic stochastic systems: the discrete switches are triggered by a stochastic…
We provide results of a deterministic approximation for non-Markovian stochastic processes modeling finite populations of individuals who recurrently play symmetric finite games and imitate each other according to payoffs. We show that a…
The state of many physical, biological and socio-technical systems evolves by combining smooth local transitions and abrupt resetting events to a set of reference values. The inclusion of the resetting mechanism not only provides the…
We study how strategic interaction can arise from controlled quantum dynamics rather than being imposed as an external mathematical structure. We introduce a class of interaction-defined quantum games in which players are represented by…
Decentralized optimization of distributed stochastic differential systems has been an active area of research for over half a century. Its formulation utilizing static team and person-by-person optimality criteria is well investigated.…
Revealing the interaction topology underlying strategic behavior is fundamental to prediction, intervention, and policy design in networked systems. Yet the interaction matrix is often unobservable, and passive observation of repeated…
Evolutionary anti-coordination games on networks capture real-world strategic situations such as traffic routing and market competition. In such games, agents maximize their utility by choosing actions that differ from their neighbors'…
Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…
The paper considers a stabilizing stochastic control which can be applied to a variety of unstable and even chaotic maps. Compared to previous methods introducing control by noise, we relax assumptions on the class of maps, as well as…
In iterated games, a player can unilaterally exert influence over the outcome through a careful choice of strategy. A powerful class of such "payoff control" strategies was discovered by Press and Dyson (2012). Their so-called…