Related papers: Self-stabilizing uncoupled dynamics

Diverse equilibrium systems with heterogeneous interactions lie at the edge of stability. Such marginally stable states are dynamically selected as the most abundant ones or as those with the largest basins of attraction. On the other hand,…

We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behaviour of the co-player, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen and…

We study the problem of Bayesian learning in a dynamical system involving strategic agents with asymmetric information. In a series of seminal papers in the literature, this problem has been investigated under a simplifying model where…

This note proposes a data-driven output-feedback stabilizing policy iteration for unknown linear discrete-time systems with unmeasurable states. Existing policy iteration methods for optimal control must start from a stabilizing control…

In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…

The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…

We use analytical techniques based on an expansion in the inverse system size to study the stochastic evolutionary dynamics of finite populations of players interacting in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We show that a mechanism of…

In this second part of our two-part paper, we invoke the stochastic maximum principle, conditional Hamiltonian and the coupled backward-forward stochastic differential equations of the first part [1] to derive team optimal decentralized…

In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…

We study a class of ordinary differential equations with a non-Lipschitz point singularity, which admit non-unique solutions through this point. As a selection criterion, we introduce stochastic regularizations depending on the parameter…

In this paper, Nash equilibrium seeking among a network of players is considered. Different from many existing works on Nash equilibrium seeking in non-cooperative games, the players considered in this paper cannot directly observe the…

Game dynamics theory, as a field of science, the consistency of theory and experiment is essential. In the past 10 years, important progress has been made in the merging of the theory and experiment in this field, in which dynamics cycle is…

This article is concerned with stability analysis and stabilization of randomly switched systems under a class of switching signals. The switching signal is modeled as a jump stochastic (not necessarily Markovian) process independent of the…

Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…

In this article, we consider a fundamental decentralized optimal control problem, which we call the two-player problem. Two subsystems are interconnected in a nested information pattern, and output feedback controllers must be designed for…

This paper proposes and studies a general form of dynamic $N$-player non-cooperative games called $\alpha$-potential games, where the change of a player's value function upon her unilateral deviation from her strategy is equal to the change…

We investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information on the payoff and without Isaacs condition. The dynamics is an ordinary differential equation parametrised by two controls chosen by the players. Each player…

In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversarial distribution. Thus each…

We consider control of heterogeneous players repeatedly playing an anti-coordination network game. In an anti-coordination game, each player has an incentive to differentiate its action from its neighbors. At each round of play, players…

In this paper, we study proximal type dynamics in the context of noncooperative multi-agent network games. These dynamics arise in different applications, since they describe distributed decision making in multi-agent networks, e.g., in…