Related papers: Reciprocity in Gift-Exchange-Games
A player's payoff is modeled as consisting of two parts: a rational-value part and a distortion-value part. It is argued that the (total) payoff function should be used to explain and predict the behaviors of the players, while the rational…
Human decision behaviour is quite diverse. In many games humans on average do not achieve maximal payoff and the behaviour of individual players remains inhomogeneous even after playing many rounds. For instance, in repeated prisoner…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…
Game theory has been one of the most successful quantitative concepts to describe social interactions, their strategical aspects, and outcomes. Among the payoff matrix quantifying the result of a social interaction, the interaction…
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…
The game-theoretic risk management framework put forth in the precursor work "Towards a Theory of Games with Payoffs that are Probability-Distributions" (arXiv:1506.07368 [q-fin.EC]) is herein extended by algorithmic details on how to…
Evolutionary game theory has impacted many fields of research by providing a mathematical framework for studying the evolution and maintenance of social and moral behaviors. This success is owed in large part to the demonstration that the…
We examine behavior in an experimental collaboration game that incorporates endogenous network formation. The environment is modeled as a generalization of the voluntary contributions mechanism. By varying the information structure in a…
The actions of intelligent agents, such as chatbots, recommender systems, and virtual assistants are typically not fully transparent to the user. Consequently, using such an agent involves the user exposing themselves to the risk that the…
Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…
Over the years, numerous experiments have been accumulated to show that cooperation is not casual and depends on the payoffs of the game. These findings suggest that humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and the same person may act…
We consider discrete time partially observable zero-sum stochastic game with average payoff criterion. We study the game using an equivalent completely observable game. We show that the game has a value and also we come up with a pair of…
In a two-person Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game, if we set a loss worth nothing and a tie worth 1, and the payoff of winning (the incentive a) as a variable, this game is called as generalized RPS game. The generalized RPS game is a…
The spread of disinformation poses a significant threat to societal well-being. We analyze this phenomenon using an evolutionary game theory model of the sender-receiver game, where senders aim to mislead receivers and receivers aim to…
This paper proposes a new approach to power in Game Theory. Cooperation and conflict are simulated with a mechanism of payoff alteration, called F-game. Using convex combinations of preferences, an F-game can measure players' attitude to…
Understanding the dynamics of reciprocation is of great interest in sociology and computational social science. The recent growth of Massively Multi-player Online Games (MMOGs) has provided unprecedented access to large-scale data which…
Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is…
We investigate evolutionary dynamics of altruism with long-range interaction on a cycle. The interaction between individuals is described by a simplified version of the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game in which the payoffs are parameterized by…
When does Sender, in a Sender-Receiver game, strictly value commitment? In a setting with finitely many actions and states, we establish that, generically, commitment has no value if and only if a partitional experiment is optimal.…