Related papers: Sharing Rewards in Cooperative Connectivity Games
This paper explores a PAC (probably approximately correct) learning model in cooperative games. Specifically, we are given $m$ random samples of coalitions and their values, taken from some unknown cooperative game; can we predict the…
In this paper, the problem of distributively seeking the equilibria of aggregative games with bilevel structures is studied. Different from the traditional aggregative games, here the aggregation is determined by the minimizer of a virtual…
We study the problem of Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, where exactly p vertices of an undirected graph must be allocated to agents such that each agent receives a connected share and does not envy another agent's share.…
In this work, we introduce graphical modelsfor multi-player game theory, and give powerful algorithms for computing their Nash equilibria in certain cases. An n-player game is given by an undirected graph on n nodes and a set of n local…
Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of…
This paper aims to balance performance and cost in a two-hop wireless cooperative communication network where the source and relays have contradictory optimization goals and make decisions in a distributed manner. This differs from most…
In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic framework for studying the problem of minimizing the completion time of instantly decodable network coding (IDNC) for cooperative data exchange (CDE) in decentralized wireless network. In this…
We study linguistic indirectness when speakers attend to social ties. Social ties are modeled by a graph, and conferences are the sets of nodes that hear a message. Conference worth is a distance polynomial on the graph; allocations are…
We study a problem of trust in a distributed system in which a common resource is shared by multiple parties. In such naturally information-limited settings, parties abide by a behavioral protocol that leads to fair sharing of the resource.…
Reward allocation, also known as the credit assignment problem, has been an important topic in economics, engineering, and machine learning. An important concept in reward allocation is the core, which is the set of stable allocations where…
Shared-constraint games are noncooperative $N$-player games where players are coupled through a common coupling constraint. It is known that such games admit two kinds of equilibria -- generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) and variational…
We introduce a game-theoretic framework to ex- plore revenue sharing in an Edge-Cloud computing system, in which computing service providers at the edge of the Internet (edge providers) and computing service providers at the cloud (cloud…
In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic framework for studying the problem of minimizing the delay of instantly decodable network coding (IDNC) for cooperative data exchange (CDE) in decentralized wireless network. In this…
This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the…
Many phenomena in real world social networks are interpreted as spread of influence between activated and non-activated network elements. These phenomena are formulated by combinatorial graphs, where vertices represent the elements and…
For networks with externalities, where each component's worth may depend on the full network structure, balanced contributions and fairness lead to distinct component-efficient allocation rules. We characterize the unique…
We study the influence of degree correlations or network mixing in interdependent security. We model the interdependence in security among agents using a dependence graph and employ a population game model to capture the interaction among…
In a seminal paper, Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant studied cost sharing protocols for network design with the objective to implement a low-cost Steiner forest as a Nash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing…
Networked public goods games model scenarios in which self-interested agents decide whether or how much to invest in an action that benefits not only themselves, but also their network neighbors. Examples include vaccination, security…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating the vertices of a graph among $n$ agents, where the value of a bundle is determined by its cut value -- the number of edges with exactly one endpoint in the bundle. This model naturally captures…