Related papers: Sharing Rewards in Cooperative Connectivity Games
A quantitative assessment of the global importance of an agent in a team is as valuable as gold for strategists, decision-makers, and sports coaches. Yet, retrieving this information is not trivial since in a cooperative task it is hard to…
We consider network aggregative games to model and study multi-agent populations in which each rational agent is influenced by the aggregate behavior of its neighbors, as specified by an underlying network. Specifically, we examine systems…
Network games are widely used as a model for selfish resource-allocation problems. In the classical model, each player selects a path connecting her source and target vertices. The cost of traversing an edge depends on the {\em load};…
In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalise the notion of "robust…
We consider a multi-organizational system in which each organization contributes processors to the global pool but also jobs to be processed on the common resources. The fairness of the scheduling algorithm is essential for the stability…
We generalize the notion of convexity and average-convexity to the notion of weighted average-convexity. We show several results on the relation between weighted average-convexity and cooperative games. First, we prove that if a game is…
Power indices are essential in assessing the contribution and influence of individual agents in multi-agent systems, providing crucial insights into collaborative dynamics and decision-making processes. While invaluable, traditional…
The multiple-input single-output interference channel is considered. Each transmitter is assumed to know the channels between itself and all receivers perfectly and the receivers are assumed to treat interference as additive noise. In this…
We study the computational complexity of "public goods games on networks". In this model, each vertex in a graph is an agent that needs to take a binary decision of whether to "produce a good" or not. Each agent's utility depends on the…
This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose…
Exchange of services and resources in, or over, networks is attracting nowadays renewed interest. However, despite the broad applicability and the extensive study of such models, e.g., in the context of P2P networks, many fundamental…
We consider a cost sharing problem on a weighted undirected graph, where all the nodes want to connect to a special node called source, and they need to share the total cost (weights) of the used edges. Each node except for the source has a…
Collaborative Vehicle Routing is where delivery companies cooperate by sharing their delivery information and performing delivery requests on behalf of each other. This achieves economies of scale and thus reduces cost, greenhouse gas…
In this short note we consider a variation of the connectivity Waiter-Client game $WC(n,q,\mathcal{A})$ played on an $n$-vertex graph $G$ which consists of $q+1$ disjoint spanning trees. In this game in each round Waiter offers Client $q+1$…
We study the extent to which decentralized cost-sharing protocols can achieve good price of anarchy (PoA) bounds in network cost-sharing games with $n$ agents. We focus on the model of resource-aware protocols, where the designer has prior…
In this paper, we address the problem of fair sharing of the total value of a crowd-sourced network system between major participants (founders) and minor participants (crowd) using cooperative game theory. Shapley allocation is regarded as…
Firms in inter-organizational networks such as supply chains or strategic alliances are exposed to interdependent risks. These are risks that are transferable across partner firms. They can be decomposed into intrinsic risks a firm faces…
Coordinating the behaviour of self-interested agents in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria is a major research challenge for multi-agent systems. Pre-game communication between all the players can aid coordination in cases where the…
We consider the impact of incomplete information on incentives for node cooperation in parallel relay networks with one source node, one destination node, and multiple relay nodes. All nodes are selfish and strategic, interested in…
The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of…