Related papers: False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games

To demonstrate the usefulness of physical approaches for the study of realistic economic systems, we investigate the inequality of players' wealth in one of the most extensively studied econophysical models, namely, the minority game (MG).…

In imperfect information games (e.g. Bridge, Skat, Poker), one of the fundamental considerations is to infer the missing information while at the same time avoiding the disclosure of private information. Disregarding the issue of protecting…

Shapley values are great analytical tools in game theory to measure the importance of a player in a game. Due to their axiomatic and desirable properties such as efficiency, they have become popular for feature importance analysis in data…

Big Boss Games represent a specific class of cooperative games where a single veto player, known as the Big Boss, plays a central role in determining resource allocation and maintaining coalition stability. In this paper, we introduce a…

Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party (an attacker) attempts to manipulate the election outcome in…

We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…

Consider discrete-time linear distributed averaging dynamics, whereby agents in a network start with uncorrelated and unbiased noisy measurements of a common underlying parameter (state of the world) and iteratively update their estimates…

We consider how selfish agents are likely to share revenues derived from maintaining connectivity between important network servers. We model a network where a failure of one node may disrupt communication between other nodes as a…

This study investigates simple games. A fundamental research question in this field is to determine necessary and sufficient conditions for a simple game to be a weighted majority game. Taylor and Zwicker (1992) showed that a simple game is…

Data valuation methods allocate payments and audit training data's contribution to machine-learning pipelines; however, they often assume passive contributors. In reality, contributors can split datasets across pseudonymous identities,…

We present a new tool for the study of multiplayer stochastic games, namely the modified game, which is a normal-form game that depends on the discount factor, the initial state, and for every player a partition of the set of states and a…

This paper deals with a new measure of the influence of each feature on the response variable in classification problems, accounting for potential dependencies among certain feature subsets. Within this framework, we consider a sample of…

When multiple influencers attempt to compete for a receiver's attention, their influencing strategies must account for the presence of one another. We introduce the Battling Influencers Game (BIG), a multi-player simultaneous-move…

In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…

Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules select a winner by successively eliminating candidates with low Borda scores. We show that these rules have a number of desirable computational properties. In particular, with unweighted votes, it is…

An opinion leader-follower model (OLF) is a two-action collective decision-making model for societies, in which three kinds of actors are considered: "opinion leaders", "followers", and "independent actors". In OLF the initial decision of…

We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th…

Consider an election between two candidates in which the voters' choices are random and independent and the probability of a voter choosing the first candidate is $p>1/2$. Condorcet's Jury Theorem which he derived from the weak law of large…

Several power indices have been introduced in the literature in order to measure the influence of individual committee members on the aggregated decision. Here we ask the inverse question and aim to design voting rules for a committee such…

The Borda voting rule is a positional scoring rule for $z$ candidates such that in each vote, the first candidate receives $z-1$ points, the second $z-2$ points and so on. The winner in the Borda rule is the candidate with highest total…