Related papers: Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions
We study the necessity of interaction for obtaining efficient allocations in subadditive combinatorial auctions. This problem was originally introduced by Dobzinski, Nisan, and Oren (STOC'14) as the following simple market scenario: $m$…
Auctions play an important role in electronic commerce, and have been used to solve problems in distributed computing. Automated approaches to designing effective auction mechanisms are helpful in reducing the burden of traditional game…
We revisit Blackwell's celebrated approachability problem which considers a repeated vector-valued game between a player and an adversary. Motivated by settings in which the action set of the player or adversary (or both) is difficult to…
When agents with independent priors bid for a single item, Myerson's optimal auction maximizes expected revenue, whereas Vickrey's second-price auction optimizes social welfare. We address the natural question of trade-offs between the two…
The optimal pricing problem is a fundamental problem that arises in combinatorial auctions. Suppose that there is one seller who has indivisible items and multiple buyers who want to purchase a combination of the items. The seller wants to…
We propose a truthful-in-expectation, $(1-1/e)$-approximation mechanism for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP). In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a set of bins without exceeding the capacity…
We propose a multi-agent distributed reinforcement learning algorithm that balances between potentially conflicting short-term reward and sparse, delayed long-term reward, and learns with partial information in a dynamic environment. We…
We study a class of iterative combinatorial auctions which can be viewed as subgradient descent methods for the problem of pricing bundles to balance supply and demand. We provide concrete convergence rates for auctions in this class,…
We consider a generalization of the unsplittable maximum two-commodity flow problem on undirected graphs where each commodity $i\in{1,2}$ can be split into a bounded number $k_i$ of equally-sized chunks that can be routed on different…
We consider the problem of finding a low-cost allocation and ordering of tasks between a team of robots in a d-dimensional, uncertain, landscape, and the sensitivity of this solution to changes in the cost function. Various algorithms have…
In e-commerce advertising, the ad platform usually relies on auction mechanisms to optimize different performance metrics, such as user experience, advertiser utility, and platform revenue. However, most of the state-of-the-art auction…
This paper studies the design and analysis of approximation algorithms for aggregating preferences over combinatorial domains, represented using Conditional Preference Networks (CP-nets). Its focus is on aggregating preferences over…
This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic techniques, which generally focus on exact and optimal…
$\newcommand{\eps}{\varepsilon}$We present an auction algorithm using multiplicative instead of constant weight updates to compute a $(1-\eps)$-approximate maximum weight matching (MWM) in a bipartite graph with $n$ vertices and $m$ edges…
We study adaptive two-sided assortment optimization for revenue maximization in choice-based matching platforms. The platform has two sides of agents, an initiating side, and a responding side. The decision-maker sequentially selects agents…
Recently, there has been increasing interest and progress in improvising the approximation algorithm for well-known NP-Complete problems, particularly the approximation algorithm for the Vertex-Cover problem. Here we have proposed a…
We consider a family of quantum spin systems which includes as special cases the ferromagnetic XY model and ferromagnetic Ising model on any graph, with or without a transverse magnetic field. We prove that the partition function of any…
A fundamental assumption in classical mechanism design is that buyers are perfect optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or a lack of information, and may not be able to perfectly…
We study an assortment optimization problem under a multi-purchase choice model in which customers choose a bundle of up to one product from each of two product categories. Different bundles have different utilities and the bundle price is…
Understanding bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions remains an ongoing challenge for researchers. Despite their widespread use, theoretical insights into the bidding behavior, revenue ranking, and efficiency of commonly used multi-unit…