Related papers: Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparis…
The notion of preference is becoming more and more ubiquitous in present-day information systems. Preferences are primarily used to filter and personalize the information reaching the users of such systems. In database systems, preferences…
Building fair recommender systems is a challenging and crucial area of study due to its immense impact on society. We extended the definitions of two commonly accepted notions of fairness to recommender systems, namely equality of…
Peer-prediction is a mechanism which elicits privately-held, non-variable information from self-interested agents---formally, truth-telling is a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. The original Peer-prediction mechanism suffers…
We introduce the model of line-up elections which captures parallel or sequential single-winner elections with a shared candidate pool. The goal of a line-up election is to find a high-quality assignment of a set of candidates to a set of…
The problem of selecting the most representative tuples from a dataset has led to the development of powerful tools, among which Skyline and Ranking (or Top-k) queries stand out for their ability to support the optimization of multiple…
We study single-candidate voting embedded in a metric space, where both voters and candidates are points in the space, and the distances between voters and candidates specify the voters' preferences over candidates. In the voting, each…
It is challenging to quantify numerical preferences for different objectives in a multi-objective decision-making problem. However, the demonstrations of a user are often accessible. We propose an algorithm to infer linear preference…
Allocating indivisible items among a set of agents is a frequently studied discrete optimization problem. In the setting considered in this work, the agents' preferences over the items are assumed to be identical. We consider a very recent…
In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting. Moreover, scenarios such as committee or board elections require voting rules that return multiple winners. In multi-winner approval voting (AV), an agent may vote…
We study the potential of large language models (LLMs) as proxies for humans to simplify preference elicitation (PE) in combinatorial assignment. While traditional PE methods rely on iterative queries to capture preferences, LLMs offer a…
The class of assignment problems is a fundamental and well-studied class in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In a general assignment problem, a group of agents expresses preferences over a…
Ranking functions that are used in decision systems often produce disparate results for different populations because of bias in the underlying data. Addressing, and compensating for, these disparate outcomes is a critical problem for fair…
Search query suggestions affect users' interactions with search engines, which then influences the information they encounter. Thus, bias in search query suggestions can lead to exposure to biased search results and can impact opinion…
Consensus ranking is a technique used to derive a single ranking that best represents the preferences of multiple individuals or systems. It aims to aggregate different rankings into one that minimizes overall disagreement or distance from…
Large Language Models (LLMs) have made it possible for recommendation systems to interact with users in open-ended conversational interfaces. In order to personalize LLM responses, it is crucial to elicit user preferences, especially when…
We consider manipulation strategies for the rank-maximal matching problem. In the rank-maximal matching problem we are given a bipartite graph $G = (A \cup P, E)$ such that $A$ denotes a set of applicants and $P$ a set of posts. Each…
Assume $k$ candidates need to be selected. The candidates appear over time. Each time one appears, it must be immediately selected or rejected -- a decision that is made by a group of individuals through voting. Assume the voters use…
We study sequential bargaining between a proposer and a veto player. Both have single-peaked preferences, but the proposer is uncertain about the veto player's ideal point. The proposer cannot commit to future proposals. When players are…
For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycles rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.…
We tackle the problem of constructive preference elicitation, that is the problem of learning user preferences over very large decision problems, involving a combinatorial space of possible outcomes. In this setting, the suggested…