Related papers: Emotional Strategies as Catalysts for Cooperation …
We study the problem of the emergence of cooperation in dynamic signed networks where agent strategies coevolve with relational signs and network topology. Running simulations based on an agent-based model, we compare results obtained in a…
Our study contributes to the debate on the evolution of cooperation in the single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) played on networks. We construct a model in which individuals are connected with positive and negative ties. Some agents play…
In this work we study a weak Prisoner\^as Dilemma game in which both strategies and update rules are subjected to evolutionary pressure. Interactions among agents are specified by complex topologies, and we consider both homogeneous and…
Evolutionary game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from science to engineering. Previous studies proposed a strategy updating mechanism, which successfully demonstrated that the scale-free network can…
We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present a minimal model taking into account the growing process of the systems and…
We study the cooperation problem in the framework of evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. Considering the growing process of the system and individuals with imitation capacity, we show conditions…
We outline a model to study the evolution of cooperation in a population of agents playing the prisoner's dilemma in signed networks. We highlight that if only dyadic interactions are taken into account, cooperation never evolves. However,…
Various theoretical and empirical studies have accounted for why humans cooperate in competitive environments. Although prior work has revealed that network structure and multiplex interactions can promote cooperation, most theory assumes…
Microscopic strategy update rules play an important role in the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation among interacting agents on complex networks. Many previous related works only consider one \emph{fixed} rule, while in the real world,…
We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different…
Cooperative behavior lies at the very basis of human societies, yet its evolutionary origin remains a key unsolved puzzle. Whereas reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the…
This paper addresses the behavior analysis problems for directed signed networks that involve cooperative-antagonistic interactions among agents. Of particular interest is to explore the convergence behaviors of directed signed networks…
We show that the resolution of social dilemmas on random graphs and scale-free networks is facilitated by imitating not the strategy of better performing players but rather their emotions. We assume sympathy and envy as the two emotions…
Non-binding communication is common in daily life and crucial for fostering cooperation, even though it has no direct payoff consequences. However, despite robust empirical evidence, its evolutionary basis remains poorly understood. Here,…
Human sociality depends upon the benefits of mutual aid and extensive communication. However mutual aid is made difficult by the problems of coordinating diverse norms and preferences, and communication is harried by substantial ambiguity…
A generic property of biological, social and economical networks is their ability to evolve in time, creating and suppressing interactions. We approach this issue within the framework of an adaptive network of agents playing a Prisoner's…
Cooperation plays a key role in the evolution of complex systems. However, the level of cooperation extensively varies with the topology of agent networks in the widely used models of repeated games. Here we show that cooperation remains…
Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoner's…
In this Letter, we study how cooperation is organized in complex topologies by analyzing the evolutionary (replicator) dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma, a two-players game with two available strategies, defection and cooperation, whose…
The maintenance of cooperation in the presence of spatial restrictions has been studied extensively. It is well-established that the underlying graph topology can significantly influence the outcome of games on graphs. Maintenance of…