Signed Networks, Triadic Interactions and the Evolution of Cooperation
Social and Information Networks
2013-10-01 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory
Neural and Evolutionary Computing
Physics and Society
Abstract
We outline a model to study the evolution of cooperation in a population of agents playing the prisoner's dilemma in signed networks. We highlight that if only dyadic interactions are taken into account, cooperation never evolves. However, when triadic considerations are introduced, a window of opportunity for emergence of cooperation as a stable behaviour emerges.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1309.7698,
title = {Signed Networks, Triadic Interactions and the Evolution of Cooperation},
author = {Simone Righi and Károly Takács},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1309.7698},
year = {2013}
}
Comments
In Proceedings Wivace 2013, arXiv:1309.7122