Related papers: A Global Game with Heterogenous Priors
Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…
In this paper I discuss truthful equilibria in common agency models. Specifically, I provide general conditions under which truthful equilibria are plausible, easy to calculate and efficient. These conditions generalize similar results in…
In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…
The mean field games (MFG) paradigm was introduced to provide tractable approximations of games involving very large populations. The theory typically rests on two key assumptions: homogeneity, meaning that all players share the same…
This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…
We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true…
In this work, we analyse the relationship between heterogeneity and cooperation. Previous investigations suggest that this relation is nontrivial, as some authors found that heterogeneity sustains cooperation, while others obtained…
We study a setting where Bayesian agents with a common prior have private information related to an event's outcome and sequentially make public announcements relating to their information. Our main result shows that when agents' private…
We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups' position in the sequence.…
Even when confronted with the same data, agents often disagree on a model of the real-world. Here, we address the question of how interacting heterogenous agents, who disagree on what model the real-world follows, optimize their trading…
The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
The influence of a fixed number of agents with the same fixed behavior on the dynamics of the minority game is studied. Alternatively, the system studied can be considered the minority game with a change in the comfort threshold away from…
We study the coevolution of network structure and signaling behavior. We model agents who can preferentially associate with others in a dynamic network while they also learn to play a simple sender-receiver game. We have four major…
A noncooperative differential (dynamic) game model of opinion dynamics is proposed. In this game, the agents' motives are shaped by their expectations of the nature of others' opinions as well as how susceptible they are to get influenced…
We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms." A recommender mechanism is one that does not have the power to…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
We study discrete preference games in heterogeneous social networks. These games model the interplay between a player's private belief and his/her publicly stated opinion (which could be different from the player's belief) as a strategic…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…