Related papers: A Global Game with Heterogenous Priors
There are only limited classes of multi-player stochastic games in which independent learning is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Markov potential games are a key example of such classes. Prior work has outlined sets of…
I introduce heterogeneity into the analysis of peer effects that arise from conformity, allowing the strength of the taste for conformity to vary across agents' actions. Using a structural model based on a simultaneous network game with…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…
Forcing finite state mean field games by a relevant form of common noise is a subtle issue, which has been addressed only recently. Among others, one possible way is to subject the simplex valued dynamics of an equilibrium by a so-called…
We study the effects of individual perceptions of payoffs in two-player games. In particular we consider the setting in which individuals' perceptions of the game are influenced by their previous experiences and outcomes. Accordingly, we…
Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…
This paper characterizes equilibrium properties of a broad class of economic models that allow multiple heterogeneous agents to interact in heterogeneous manners across several markets. Our key contribution is a new theorem providing…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…
We propose a new model of minority game with so-called smart agents such that the standard deviation and the total loss in this model reach the theoretical minimum values in the limit of long time. The smart agents use trail and error…
Cooperation in heterogeneous groups, where individuals differ in resources, productivity, and behavioural responsiveness, underpins collective action across many social and biological systems. Introspection dynamics, in which each player…
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…
The Minority Game framework was recently generalized to account for the possibility that agents adapt not only through strategy selection but also by diversifying their response according to the kind of dynamical regime, or the risk, they…
Which equilibria will arise in signaling games depends on how the receiver interprets deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, and an associated equilibrium refinement, in a model where…
We show that, in large population games, decentralized information aggregation generically corrects for individual-level biases. This establishes a new testable aggregate efficiency benchmark where the behavior of boundedly rational agents…
This paper studies a nonzero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time under non-exponential discounting. For both players, there are two levels of game-theoretic reasoning intertwined. First, each player looks for an intra-personal equilibrium…
Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force…
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of…