Related papers: Dynamics in atomic signaling games
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
Recently, the eco-evolutionary game theory which describes the coupled dynamics of strategies and environment have attracted great attention. At the same time, most of the current work is focused on the classic two-player two-strategy game.…
In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies the success of a mutant strategy via the probability that a…
We consider a dynamic social network model in which agents play repeated games in pairings determined by a stochastically evolving social network. Individual agents begin to interact at random, with the interactions modeled as games. The…
We introduce and study a mean-field model for a system of spatially distributed players interacting through an evolutionary game driven by a replicator dynamics. Strategies evolve by a replicator dynamics influenced by the position and the…
Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design information structures to ameliorate the overall experience…
Evolutionary game theory has proved to be a powerful tool to probe the self-organisation of collective behaviour by considering frequency-dependent fitness in evolutionary processes. It has shown that the stability of a strategy depends not…
In this paper we extend the framework of evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions dealing with the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the…
Humans and other animals can adapt their social behavior in response to environmental cues including the feedback obtained through experience. Nevertheless, the effects of the experience-based learning of players in evolution and…
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are…
Learning to communicate is considered an essential task to develop a general AI. While recent literature in language evolution has studied emergent language through discrete or continuous message symbols, there has been little work in the…
Costly cooperation and costly signaling are both difficult to reconcile with simple fitness maximization, yet both are common in biological and social systems. We study a model in which agents emit costly signals and condition their actions…
We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different…
A simple spatial computer simulation model was recently introduced to study the evolution of the linguistic diversity. The model considers processes of selective geographic colonization, linguistic anomalous diffusion and mutation. In the…
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…
Building upon the eco-evolutionary game dynamics framework established by Tilman et al., we investigate stochastic fluctuations in a two-strategy system incorporating environmental feedback mechanisms, where the payoff matrix exhibits…
We study the coevolution of network structure and signaling behavior. We model agents who can preferentially associate with others in a dynamic network while they also learn to play a simple sender-receiver game. We have four major…
So far, the theory of equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is insensitive to communication possibilities. To address this issue, we incorporate the assumption that communication reduces -- but does not…
The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…
Human social life is shaped by repeated interactions, where past experiences guide future behavior. In evolutionary game theory, a key challenge is to identify strategies that harness such memory to succeed in repeated encounters. Decades…