Related papers: Measuring voting power in convex policy spaces

How should we evaluate the effect of a policy on the likelihood of an undesirable event, such as conflict? The significance test has three limitations. First, relying on statistical significance misses the fact that uncertainty is a…

Automated program verification often proceeds by exhibiting inductive invariants entailing the desired properties.For numerical properties, a classical class of invariants is convex polyhedra: solution sets of system of linear…

Identifying the trade-offs between model-based and model-free methods is a central question in reinforcement learning. Value-based methods offer substantial computational advantages and are sometimes just as statistically efficient as…

We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…

We consider two-tier voting system and try to determine optimal weights for a fair representation in such systems. A prominent example of such a voting system is the Council of Ministers of the European Union. Under the assumption of…

Opinion Dynamics models can be, for most of them, divided between discrete and continuous. They are used in different circumstances and the relationship between them is not clear. Here we will explore the relationship between a model where…

We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities…

Though learning has become a core component of modern information processing, there is now ample evidence that it can lead to biased, unsafe, and prejudiced systems. The need to impose requirements on learning is therefore paramount,…

Social influence plays an important role in human behavior and decisions. The sources of influence can be generally divided into external, which are independent of social context, or as originating from peers, such as family and friends. An…

A recently proposed graph-theoretic metric, the influence gap, has shown to be a reliable predictor of the effect of social influence in two-party elections, albeit only tested on regular and scale-free graphs. Here, we investigate whether…

What role do non-elected bureaucrats play when elections provide imperfect accountability and create incentives for pandering? We develop a model where politicians and bureaucrats interact to implement policy. Both can either be good,…

We present an alternative voting system that aims at bridging the gap between proportional representative systems and majoritarian, single winner election systems. The system lets people vote for multiple parties, but then assigns each…

We study a model of a population making a binary decision based on information spreading within the population, which is fully connected or covering a square grid. We assume that a fraction of the population wants to make the choice of the…

Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of representative candidates based on voters' preferences. It occurs in applications ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer…

Measure what is measurable, and make measurable what is not so (Galileo Galilei). According to the above sentence we do not ask why we need to measure democracy but if it is possible to measure something which is not unequivocally defined.…

Systems of indirect voting based on the principle of qualified majority can be analysed using the methods of game theory. In particular, this applies to the voting system in the Council of the European Union, which was recently a subject of…

We propose a framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about the preferences of other voters, or about other voters' knowledge about her own preference. In this setting we define notions of manipulation, equilibrium,…

We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints,…

In many applications of cooperative game theory -- from corporate governance and cartel formation to parliamentary voting -- not all winning coalitions are feasible. Ideological distances, institutional constraints, or pre-electoral…

In this paper, we propose an improved version of the power index related to the Banzhaf power index for weighted voting systems. This index now takes into account the mutual persuasion power matrix(PPM) existing among the voters. This…