Related papers: Counting Popular Matchings in House Allocation Pro…
The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison, fairness in settings with preferences on both sides, that is,…
Rank aggregation is an essential approach for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. One rule of particular interest is the Kemeny rule, which maximises the number of pairwise agreements between the final ranking and the existing…
In a multiple partners matching problem the agents can have multiple partners up to their capacities. In this paper we consider both the two-sided many-to-many stable matching problem and the one-sided stable fixtures problem under…
The stable roommates problem can admit multiple different stable matchings. We have different criteria for deciding which one is optimal, but computing those is often NP-hard. We show that the problem of finding generous or rank-maximal…
The computational study of elections generally assumes that the preferences of the electorate come in as a list of votes. Depending on the context, it may be much more natural to represent the list succinctly, as the distinct votes of the…
The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical formulation, n…
The classical linear ordering problem seeks a single ranking representing a given preference matrix. While suitable for homogeneous populations, it fails when observed preferences arise from several latent groups with distinct ranking…
Given a set of pairwise comparisons, the classical ranking problem computes a single ranking that best represents the preferences of all users. In this paper, we study the problem of inferring individual preferences, arising in the context…
Here we prove that counting maximum matchings in planar, bipartite graphs is #P-complete. This is somewhat surprising in the light that the number of perfect matchings in planar graphs can be computed in polynomial time. We also prove that…
Bipartite b-matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to one or more agents or items on the other, is a classical model that is used in myriad application areas such as healthcare, advertising, education, and general…
In this paper, we consider the problem of computing an optimal matching in a bipartite graph where elements of one side of the bipartition specify preferences over the other side, and one or both sides can have capacities and…
Within personalized marketing, a recommendation issue known as multicampaign assignment is to overcome a critical problem, known as the multiple recommendation problem which occurs when running several personalized campaigns simultaneously.…
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
We consider the task of allocating indivisible items to agents, when the agents' preferences over the items are identical. The preferences are captured by means of a directed acyclic graph, with vertices representing items and an edge…
The classic house allocation problem involves assigning $m$ houses to $n$ agents based on their utility functions, ensuring each agent receives exactly one house. A key criterion in these problems is satisfying fairness constraints such as…
A central problem in multiagent systems is the fair assignment of objects to agents. In this paper, we initiate the analysis of classic majoritarian social choice functions in assignment. Exploiting the special structure of the assignment…
We study the problem of aggregating individual preferences over alternatives into a collective ranking. A distinctive feature of our setting is that agents are matched to alternatives. Applications include rankings of colleges or academic…
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show…
We study the caching problem when we are allowed to match each user to one of a subset of caches after its request is revealed. We focus on non-uniformly popular content, specifically when the file popularities obey a Zipf distribution. We…
We study the complexity of deciding whether there is a tie in a given approval-based multiwinner election, as well as the complexity of counting tied winning committees. We consider a family of Thiele rules, their greedy variants,…