Related papers: Conditional Expectations of Correspondences
We study whether a logic based on team semantics can be enriched with a conditional satisfying minimal requirements--namely, preservation of the closure property of the logic, Modus Ponens, and the Deduction Theorem. We show that such…
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…
The continuity of conditional expectation on Orlicz spaces is investigated. Indeed, we provide some necessary and sufficient conditions on a sequence $\{\mathcal{A}_n\}_{n\in\mathbb{N}}$ of $\sigma$-subalgebras for $L^{\varphi}$-convergence…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
We propose a novel approach for estimating conditional or parametric expectations in the setting where obtaining samples or evaluating integrands is costly. Through the framework of probabilistic numerical methods (such as Bayesian…
Game-theoretic upper expectations are joint (global) probability models that mathematically describe the behaviour of uncertain processes in terms of supermartingales; capital processes corresponding to available betting strategies.…
We introduce the notion of regularized Bayesian best response (RBBR) learning dynamic in heterogeneous population games. We obtain such a dynamic via perturbation by an arbitrary lower semicontinuous, strongly convex regularizer in Bayesian…
We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…
For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
A qualitative account is given of a differential pursuit/evasion game. A criterion for the existence of an intercept solution is obtained using future cones that contain all attainable trajectories of target or interceptor originating from…
This study investigates differential games with motion-payoff uncertainty in continuous-time settings. We propose a framework where players update their beliefs about uncertain parameters using continuous Bayesian updating. Theoretical…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…
We study a class of games with a continuum of players for which Cournot-Nash equilibria can be obtained by the minimisation of some cost, related to optimal transport. This cost is not convex in the usual sense in general but it turns out…
We consider a setting in which a principal gets to choose which game from some given set is played by a group of agents. The principal would like to choose a game that favors one of the players, the social preferences of the players, or the…
In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…
We present a simpler proof of the existence of equilibria for a class of mean field games with common noise, where players interact through the conditional law given the current value of the common noise rather than its entire path. By…
In this paper we propose two new monotonicity conditions that could serve as sufficient conditions for uniqueness of Nash equilibria in mean field games. In this study we aim for $unconditional\ uniqueness$ that is independent of the length…
I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…
We study rational synthesis problems for concurrent games with omega-regular objectives. Our model of rationality considers only pure strategy Nash equilibria that satisfy either a social welfare or Pareto optimality condition with respect…