Related papers: When "I cut, you choose" method implies intransiti…
We study cautious reasoning in finite sequential games played by agents with perfect recall. Our contribution lies in formulating a definition of prudent rationalizability (Heifetz et al. 2021, BEJTE) as an iterative reduction procedure of…
Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…
We develop a qualitative model of decision making with two aims: to describe how people make simple decisions and to enable computer programs to do the same. Current approaches based on Planning or Decisions Theory either ignore uncertainty…
We conducted an experiment where participants played a perfect-information game against a computer, which was programmed to deviate often from its backward induction strategy right at the beginning of the game. Participants knew that in…
Coalition Logic is an important logic in logical studies of strategic reasoning, whose models are concurrent game models. In this paper, first, we systematically discuss three assumptions of concurrent game models and argue that they are…
Coordination is a desirable feature in many multi-agent systems such as robotic and socioeconomic networks. We consider a task allocation problem as a binary networked coordination game over an undirected regular graph. Each agent in the…
The aim of this article is to propose a core game theory model of transaction costs wherein it is indicated how direct costs determine the probability of loss and subsequent transaction costs. The existence of optimum is proven, and the way…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
We present a novel two-player game in a chaotic dynamical system where players have opposing objectives regarding the system's behavior. The game is analyzed using a methodology from the field of chaos control known as partial control. Our…
The standard rational choice model describes individuals as making choices by selecting the best option from a menu. A wealth of evidence instead suggests that individuals often filter menus into smaller sets - consideration sets - from…
Our preferences depend on the circumstances in which we reveal them. We will introduce a dependency which allows us to illustrate the relation between the possibility of winning of particular candidates in a quantum election and the type of…
In this paper, we make a review on the concepts of rationality across several different fields, namely in economics, psychology and evolutionary biology and behavioural ecology. We review how processes like natural selection can help us…
It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We…
The article bridges between two major paradigms in computation, the functional, at basis computation from input to output, and the interactive, where computation reacts to its environment while underway. Central to any compositional theory…
One of the most remarkable things about the human moral mind is its flexibility. We can make moral judgments about cases we have never seen before. We can decide that pre-established rules should be broken. We can invent novel rules on the…
In this paper, we study the notion of admissibility for randomised strategies in concurrent games. Intuitively, an admissible strategy is one where the player plays `as well as possible', because there is no other strategy that dominates…
This paper consider the possibility of using some quantum tools in decision making strategies. In particular, we consider here a dynamical open quantum system helping two players, $\G_1$ and $\G_2$, to take their decisions in a specific…
In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…
We consider (random) strategic interactions in a large population consisting of a variety of players. A rational player chooses actions that maximize certain utility functions, while a behavioral player chooses actions based on preferences…
The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk…