Related papers: When "I cut, you choose" method implies intransiti…
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are…
Traffic scenarios are inherently interactive. Multiple decision-makers predict the actions of others and choose strategies that maximize their rewards. We view these interactions from the perspective of game theory which introduces various…
The ability to estimate human intentions and interact with human drivers intelligently is crucial for autonomous vehicles to successfully achieve their objectives. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic planning algorithm that models…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…
Coalition Logic is a central logic in logical research on strategic reasoning. In a recent paper, Li and Ju argued that generally, models of Coalition Logic, concurrent game models, have three too strong assumptions: seriality, independence…
In this paper, we analyse inspection games with an evolutionary perspective. In our evolutionary inspection game with a large population, each individual is not a rational payoff maximiser, but periodically updates his strategy if he…
Transfinite set theory including the axiom of choice supplies the following basic theorems: (1) Mappings between infinite sets can always be completed, such that at least one of the sets is exhausted. (2) The real numbers can be well…
Humans exhibit irrational decision-making patterns in response to environmental triggers, such as experiencing an economic loss or gain. In this paper we investigate whether algorithms exhibit the same behavior by examining the observed…
We argue that an explainable artificial intelligence must possess a rationale for its decisions, be able to infer the purpose of observed behaviour, and be able to explain its decisions in the context of what its audience understands and…
In Newcomb's paradox you choose to receive either the contents of a particular closed box, or the contents of both that closed box and another one. Before you choose, a prediction algorithm deduces your choice, and fills the two boxes based…
It has long been believed that Chess is the \emph{Drosophila} of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Studying Chess can productively provide valid knowledge about complex systems. Although remarkable progress has been made on solving Chess, the…
This thesis presents some geometric insights into three different types of two player prediction games -- namely general learning task, prediction with expert advice, and online convex optimization. These games differ in the nature of the…
As recommender systems are being designed and deployed for an increasing number of socially-consequential applications, it has become important to consider what properties of fairness these systems exhibit. There has been considerable…
We consider two-player games played on finite colored graphs where the goal is the construction of an infinite path with one of the following frequency-related properties: (i) all colors occur with the same asymptotic frequency, (ii) there…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
I survey recent progress on a classic and challenging problem in social choice: the fair division of indivisible items. I discuss how a computational perspective has provided interesting insights into and understanding of how to divide…
In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…
Given a dynamic ordinal game, we deem a strategy sequentially rational if there exist a Bernoulli utility function and a conditional probability system with respect to which the strategy is a maximizer. We establish a complete class theorem…
We present a general logical framework for reasoning about agents' cognitive attitudes of both epistemic type and motivational type. We show that it allows us to express a variety of relevant concepts for qualitative decision theory…
Classical reactive synthesis approaches aim to synthesize a reactive system that always satisfies a given specifications. These approaches often reduce to playing a two-player zero-sum game where the goal is to synthesize a winning…