Related papers: Optimal Impartial Selection
In this paper, we study the problem of eliciting preferences of agents in the house allocation model. For this we build on a recent model of Hosseini et al.[AAAI'21] and focus on the task of eliciting preferences to find matchings which are…
A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this…
This work researches the impact of including a wider range of participants in the strategy-making process on the performance of organizations which operate in either moderately or highly complex environments. Agent-based simulation…
In this paper I present several algorithmic techniques for improving the decision process of multiple types of agents behaving in environments where their interests are in conflict. The interactions between the agents are modelled by using…
We take another look at the general problem of selecting a preferred probability measure among those that comply with some given constraints. The dominant role that entropy maximization has obtained in this context is questioned by arguing…
We analyze an extended model of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma where agents decide to play based on the data from their limited memory or recommendations. The cooperators can decide whether to play with the matched opponent or not. The…
Inspired by real-world applications such as the assignment of pupils to schools or the allocation of social housing, the one-sided matching problem studies how a set of agents can be assigned to a set of objects when the agents have…
We study the committee selection problem in the canonical impartial culture model with a large number of voters and an even larger candidate set. Here, each voter independently reports a uniformly random preference order over the…
We consider a moral hazard problem with multiple principals in a continuous-time model. The agent can only work exclusively for one principal at a given time, so faces an optimal switching problem. Using a randomized formulation, we manage…
We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matching problems when agents have unrestricted cardinal preferences over a finite set of items. Random priority is a very well-known…
We introduce the study of sequential information elicitation in strategic multi-agent systems. In an information elicitation setup a center attempts to compute the value of a function based on private information (a-k-a secrets) accessible…
AI systems increasingly assist human decision making by producing preliminary assessments of complex inputs. However, such AI-generated assessments can often be noisy or systematically biased, raising a central question: how should costly…
We study the design of effort-maximizing grading schemes between agents with private abilities. Assuming agents derive value from the information their grade reveals about their ability, we find that more informative grading schemes induce…
Selecting a set of alternatives based on the preferences of agents is an important problem in committee selection and beyond. Among the various criteria put forth for the desirability of a committee, Pareto optimality is a minimal and…
Algorithmic fairness for artificial intelligence has become increasingly relevant as these systems become more pervasive in society. One realm of AI, recommender systems, presents unique challenges for fairness due to trade offs between…
Team assembly is a problem that demands trade-offs between multiple fairness criteria and computational optimization. We focus on four criteria: (i) fair distribution of workloads within the team, (ii) fair distribution of skills and…
I introduce a dynamic model of learning and random meetings between a long-lived agent with unknown ability and heterogeneous projects with observable qualities. The outcomes of the agent's matches with the projects determine her posterior…
We study functions that produce a ranking of $n$ individuals from $n$ such rankings and are impartial in the sense that the position of an individual in the output ranking does not depend on the input ranking submitted by that individual.…
We study secretary problems in settings with multiple agents. In the standard secretary problem, a sequence of arbitrary awards arrive online, in a random order, and a single decision maker makes an immediate and irrevocable decision…
As recommender systems are being designed and deployed for an increasing number of socially-consequential applications, it has become important to consider what properties of fairness these systems exhibit. There has been considerable…