Related papers: Bounded rationality in a dynamic alternate game

We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve…

Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…

Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…

Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…

The dominant theories of rational choice assume logical omniscience. That is, they assume that when facing a decision problem, an agent can perform all relevant computations and determine the truth value of all relevant logical/mathematical…

Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the…

We present a framework that incorporates the idea of bounded rationality into dynamic stochastic pursuit-evasion games. The solution of a stochastic game is characterized, in general, by its (Nash) equilibria in feedback form. However,…

Game theory has traditionally had a relatively limited view of risk based on how a player's expected reward is impacted by the uncertainty of the actions of other players. Recently, a new game-theoretic approach provides a more holistic…

The game in which acts of participants don't have an adequate description in terms of Boolean logic and classical theory of probabilities is considered. The model of the game interaction is constructed on the basis of a non-distributive…

It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We…

Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…

Admissible strategies, i.e. those that are not dominated by any other strategy, are a typical rationality notion in game theory. In many classes of games this is justified by results showing that any strategy is admissible or dominated by…

Consider a game where Alice generates an integer and Bob wins if he can factor that integer. Traditional game theory tells us that Bob will always win this game even though in practice Alice will win given our usual assumptions about the…

Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…

In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversarial distribution. Thus each…

Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…

We consider solutions of normal form games that are invariant under strategic equivalence. We consider additional properties that can be expected (or be desired) from a solution of a game, and we observe the following: - Even the weakest…

We use ideas from distributed computing and game theory to study dynamic and decentralized environments in which computational nodes, or decision makers, interact strategically and with limited information. In such environments, which arise…

In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.…

Bounded rationality refers to the non-optimal rationality of players in non-cooperative games. In a networked game, the bounded rationality of players may be heterogeneous and spatially distributed. It has been shown that the `system…