Related papers: Language-based Games

This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of…

This paper has two central aims: first, to provide simple conditions under which the generalized games in choice form and, consequently, the abstract economies, admit equilibrium; second, to study the solvability of several types of systems…

At a mixed Nash equilibrium, the payoff of a player does not depend on her own action, as long as her opponent sticks to his. In a periodic strategy, a concept developed in a previous paper (arXiv:1307.2035v4), in contrast, the own payoff…

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as…

In this work, after given the definition of soft sets and their basic operations we define two person soft games which can apply to problems contain vagueness and uncertainty. We then give four solution methods of the games which are soft…

It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with…

We consider a dynamical approach to sequential games. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction…

It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or…

Game theory studies situations in which strategic players can modify the state of a given system, due to the absence of a central authority. Solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are defined to predict the outcome of such situations.…

We consider a dynamical approach to game in extensive forms. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding…

While fictitious play is guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibrium in certain game classes, such as two-player zero-sum games, it is not guaranteed to converge in non-zero-sum and multiplayer games. We show that fictitious play in fact…

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed to support human decision-making. This use of LLMs has concerning implications, especially when their prescriptions affect the welfare of others. To gauge how LLMs make social…

As interaction between autonomous agents, communication can be analyzed in game-theoretic terms. Meaning game is proposed to formalize the core of intended communication in which the sender sends a message and the receiver attempts to infer…

This paper introduces a unified framework called cooperative extensive form games, which (i) generalizes standard non-cooperative games, and (ii) allows for more complex coalition formation dynamics than previous concepts like…

Contrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games, it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong cooperation assumption.…

$S$ equilibrium synthesizes a century of game-theoretic modeling. $S$-beliefs determine choices as in the refinement literature and level-$k$, without anchoring on Nash equilibrium or imposing ad hoc belief formation. $S$-choices allow for…

We introduce operational semantics into games. And based on the operational semantics, we establish a full algebra of games, including basic algebra of games, algebra of concurrent games, recursion and abstraction. The algebra can be used…

Mathematical models of interactions among rational agents have long been studied in game theory. However these interactions are often over a small set of discrete game actions which is very different from how humans communicate in natural…

This work introduces a unified framework for analyzing games in greater depth. In the existing literature, players' strategies are typically assigned scalar values, and equilibrium concepts are used to identify compatible choices. However,…

We analyse the typical structure of games in terms of the connectivity properties of their best-response graphs. Our central result shows that, among games that are `generic' (without indifferences) and that have a pure Nash equilibrium,…