Related papers: Language-based Games
We study solution concepts for normal-form games. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria and logit quantal response equilibria, as well as generalizations capturing non-expected utility. Our axioms reflect that players are…
In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the…
We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a…
Large language models (LLMs) can exhibit biases in reasoning capabilities due to linguistic modality, performing better on tasks in one language versus another, even with similar content. Most previous works evaluate this through reasoning…
Nash Learning from Human Feedback is a game-theoretic framework for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences by modeling learning as a two-player zero-sum game. However, using raw preference as the payoff in the game…
We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…
Reasoning is not just about solving problems -- it is also about evaluating which problems are worth solving at all. Evaluations of artificial intelligence (AI) systems primarily focused on problem solving, historically by studying how…
Drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, we present a novel framework, constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in resource selection games (i.e., asymmetric singleton congestion games) with nonatomic…
Speakers communicate to influence their partner's beliefs and shape their actions. Belief- and action-based objectives have been explored independently in recent computational models, but it has been challenging to explicitly compare or…
At the beginning of 2022, a simplistic word-guessing game took the world by storm and was further adapted to many languages beyond the original English version. In this paper, we examine the strategies of daily word-guessing game players…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…
To generalize complementarities for games, we introduce some conditions weaker than quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property. We prove that the Nash equilibria of a game satisfying these conditions form a nonempty complete…
A classic model to study strategic decision making in multi-agent systems is the normal-form game. This model can be generalised to allow for an infinite number of pure strategies leading to continuous games. Multi-objective normal-form…
"This paper introduces a new task and a new dataset", "we improve the state of the art in X by Y" -- it is rare to find a current natural language processing paper (or AI paper more generally) that does not contain such statements. What is…
In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…
Behavioral diversity, expert imitation, fairness, safety goals and others give rise to preferences in sequential decision making domains that do not decompose additively across time. We introduce the class of convex Markov games that allow…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…
Congestion games offer a primary model in the study of pure Nash equilibria in non-cooperative games, and a number of generalized models have been proposed in the literature. One line of generalization includes weighted congestion games, in…