Related papers: Coalitions in Routing Games: A Worst-Case Perspect…
The purpose of this work is to pose and solve the problem to guide a collection of weakly interacting dynamical systems (agents, particles, etc.) to a specified terminal distribution. The framework is that of mean-field and of cooperative…
The paper studies the routing in the network shared by several users. Each user seeks to optimize either its own performance or some combination between its own performance and that of other users, by controlling the routing of its given…
Coordinating the movement of multiple autonomous agents over a shared network is a fundamental challenge in algorithmic robotics, intelligent transportation, and distributed systems. The dominant approach, Multi-Agent Path Finding, relies…
We broaden the basis of non-cooperative game theory by considering miscoordination on a solution concept. For any solution concept, we extend the solution set of a strategic-form game to a transition set. This set contains profiles where…
In today's dynamic and interconnected world, resource constraints pose significant challenges across various domains, ranging from networks, logistics and manufacturing to project management and optimization, etc. Resource-constrained…
In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…
Operating vehicles in adversarial environments between a recurring origin-destination pair requires new planning techniques. A two players zero-sum game is introduced. The goal of the first player is to minimize the expected casualties…
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…
We extend the list of games where the nucleolus is computable in polynomial time. Based on the classical MPS scheme, nucleolus computation can be reduced to the problem of finding a coalition with minimum excess that does not belong to a…
When people choose routes minimizing their individual delay, the aggregate congestion can be much higher compared to that experienced by a centrally-imposed routing. Yet centralized routing is incompatible with the presence of…
We study the subclass of singleton congestion games with identical and increasing cost functions, i.e., each agent tries to utilize from the least crowded resource in her accessible subset of resources. Our main contribution is a novel…
In the context of networking, research has focused on non-cooperative games, where the selfish agents cannot reach a binding agreement on the way they would share the infrastructure. Many approaches have been proposed for mitigating the…
Matching games naturally generalize assignment games, a well-known class of cooperative games. Interest in matching games has grown recently due to some breakthrough results and new applications. This state-of-the-art survey provides an…
The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an…
The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually employs values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, the values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to high costs associated with their determination…
The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings,…
We study fair allocation of profit (or cost) for three central problems from combinatorial optimization: Max-Flow, MST and $b$-matching. The essentially unequivocal choice of solution concept for this purpose would be the core, because of…
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…
We study bottleneck routing games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. Bottleneck games have been studied in the literature by having the player's utility costs to be determined by the…
We study relationships between different relaxed notions of core stability in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. Our unified approach applies to a newly introduced family of hedonic games, called $\alpha$-hedonic…