Related papers: The nucleolus of large majority games

We study the nucleolus in a class of cooperative games where agents collaborate by sharing demands and production-distribution capacities across multiple markets. These production-distribution games form a structured subclass of linear…

Based on Holler (1982) and Armijos-Toro et al. (2021) we propose two power indices to measure the influence of the players in the class of weighted majority games in partition function form. We compare these new power indices with their…

A committee's decisions on more than two alternatives much depend on the adopted voting method, and so does the distribution of power among the committee members. We investigate how different aggregation methods such as plurality runoff,…

Voting power determines the "power" of individuals who cast votes; their power is based on their ability to influence the winning-ness of a coalition. Usually each individual acts alone, casting either all or none of their votes and is…

Coalitional voting games appear in different forms in multi-agent systems, social choice and threshold logic. In this paper, the complexity of comparison of influence between players in coalitional voting games is characterized. The…

Generalization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each time step every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of…

Consider an election between k candidates in which each voter votes randomly (but not necessarily independently) and suppose that there is a single candidate that every voter prefers (in the sense that each voter is more likely to vote for…

We partially modify the rules of the Minority Game (MG) by introducing some degree of local information in the game, which is only available for some agents, called the interacting agents. Our work shows that, for small values of the new…

Important decisions are likely made by groups of agents. Thus group decision making is very common in practice. Very transparent group aggregating rules are given by weighted voting, where each agent is assigned a weight. Here a proposal is…

Systems of indirect voting based on the principle of qualified majority can be analysed using the methods of game theory. In particular, this applies to the voting system in the Council of the European Union, which was recently a subject of…

We give conditions for equilibria in the following Voronoi game on the discrete hypercube. Two players position themselves in $\{0,1\}^d$ and each receives payoff equal to the measure (under some probability distribution) of their Voronoi…

The concept of power among players can be expressed as a combination of their utilities. A player who obeys another takes into account the utility of the dominant one. Technically it is a matter of superimposing some weighted sum or product…

The Minority Game is a simple model for the collective behavior of agents in an idealized situation where they have to compete through adaptation for a finite resource. This review summarizes the statistical mechanics community efforts to…

Using the Minority Game model we study a broad spectrum of problems of market mechanism. We study the role of different types of agents: producers, speculators as well as noise traders. The central issue here is the information flow :…

The minority game is a simple congestion game in which the players' main goal is to choose among two options the one that is adopted by the smallest number of players. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria and the limiting behavior of…

We provide a theoretical description of the Minority Game in terms of crowd effects. The size of the fluctuations arising in the game is controlled by the interplay between crowds of like-minded agents and their anti-correlated partners…

In a weighted majority voting game, the players' weights are determined based on the constitutional planner's intentions. The weights are challenging to change in numerous cases, as they represent some desired disparity. However, the voting…

We consider a committee voting on whether to adopt a reform under a quota rule, where members differ in how much they value the reform some supporting it, others opposing it. We examine how members can influence each other's votes through…

We study bargaining games between suppliers and manufacturers in a network context. Agents wish to enter into contracts in order to generate surplus which then must be divided among the participants. Potential contracts and their surplus…

In the standard minority game, each agent in the minority group receives the same payoff regardless of the size of the minority group. Of great interest for real social and biological systems are cases in which the payoffs to members of the…