Related papers: The nucleolus of large majority games
We investigate the distribution of the well-studied Shapley--Shubik values in weighted voting games where the agents are stochastically determined. The Shapley--Shubik value measures the voting power of an agent, in typical collective…
This contribution deals with a two-level discrete decision problem, a so-called Stackelberg strategic game: A Subset Sum setting is addressed with a set $N$ of items with given integer weights. One distinguished player, the leader, may…
In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game theory does not apply if different participants hold different opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in…
In many circumstances there is a trade off between the number of voters and the time they can be given before having to make a decision since both aspects are costly. An example is the hiring of a committee with a fixed salary budget: more…
The Shapley-Shubik index was designed to evaluate the power distribution in committee systems drawing binary decisions and is one of the most established power indices. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval…
Naming Game is a recently proposed model for describing how a multi-agent system can converge towards a consensus state in a self-organized way. In this paper, we investigate this model on the so-called homogeneous small-world networks and…
We consider two-player games played over finite state spaces for an infinite number of rounds. At each state, the players simultaneously choose moves; the moves determine a successor state. It is often advantageous for players to choose…
We investigate systems of indirect voting based on the law of Penrose, in which each representative in the voting body receives the number of votes (voting weight) proportional to the square root of the population he or she represents. For…
What is the physical origin of player cooperation in minority game? And how to obtain maximum global wealth in minority game? We answer the above questions by studying a variant of minority game from which players choose among $N_c$…
In a function that takes its inputs from various players, the effect of a player measures the variation he can cause in the expectation of that function. In this paper we prove a tight upper bound on the number of players with large effect,…
Oftentimes, the Shapley value becomes infeasible for games with many players. However, establishing symmetry allows for polynomial-time computation. To examine this reduction, we identify the spectrum of homogeneous group games by using an…
We define a notion of the criticality of a player for simple monotone games based on cooperation with other players, either to form a winning coalition or to break a winning one, with an essential role for all the players involved. We…
We study a distributed allocation process where, repeatedly in time, every player renegotiates past allocations with neighbors and allocates new revenues. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging…
There are many factors that can influence the outcome of an election. We here identify two dominant effects that can affect the votes obtained by a candidate, namely, the Majority Effect and the Media Effect. We mimic these two effects in a…
The game in which acts of participants don't have an adequate description in terms of Boolean logic and classical theory of probabilities is considered. The model of the game interaction is constructed on the basis of a non-distributive…
We consider the approval-based model of elections, and undertake a computational study of voting rules which select committees whose size is not predetermined. While voting rules that output committees with a predetermined number of winning…
The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually depends on values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to various reasons. We introduce a method to…
Politics around the world exhibits increasing polarization, demonstrated in part by rigid voting configurations in institutions like legislatures or courts. A crux of polarization is separation along a unidimensional ideological axis, but…
Evolutionary games on graphs describe how strategic interactions and population structure determine evolutionary success, quantified by the probability that a single mutant takes over a population. Graph structures, compared to the…
We use the Minority Game as a testing frame for the problem of the emergence of diversity in socio-economic systems. For the MG with heterogeneous impacts, we show that the direct generalization of the usual agents' profit does not fit some…