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In spatial games players typically alter their strategy by imitating the most successful or one randomly selected neighbor. Since a single neighbor is taken as reference, the information stemming from other neighbors is neglected, which…
In this paper, the Optional Prisoner's Dilemma game in a spatial environment, with coevolutionary rules for both the strategy and network links between agents, is studied. Using a Monte Carlo simulation approach, a number of experiments are…
We study an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with two layered graphs, where the lower layer is the physical infrastructure on which the interactions are taking place and the upper layer represents the connections for the strategy…
We study a spatial two-strategy (cooperation and defection) Prisoner's Dilemma game with two types ($A$ and $B$) of players located on the sites of a square lattice. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by iterated strategy…
The emergence of complex networks from evolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed to switch interaction partners. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is defined on a random network with…
The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to…
We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who can choose one of the two strategies (named cooperation and defection for social dilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application of the…
We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection timescale is slower…
Microscopic strategy update rules play an important role in the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation among interacting agents on complex networks. Many previous related works only consider one \emph{fixed} rule, while in the real world,…
A simplified prisoner's game is studied on a square lattice when the players interacting with their neighbors can follow only two strategies: to cooperate (C) or to defect (D) unconditionally. The players updated in a random sequence have a…
We study the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy ("cooperation" and "defection") games in populations comprising cooperation facilitators. The latter are individuals that…
Cooperation is ubiquitous in nature, but explaining its existence remains a central interdisciplinary challenge. Cooperation is most difficult to explain in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, where cooperators always lose in direct competition…
In times of plenty expectations rise, just as in times of crisis they fall. This can be mathematically described as a Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy with dynamic aspiration levels, where individuals aspire to be as wealthy as their average…
The Prisoner's dilemma is the main game theoretical framework in which the onset and maintainance of cooperation in biological populations is studied. In the spatial version of the model, we study the robustness of cooperation in…
The stable cooperation ratio of spatial evolutionary games has been widely studied using simulations or approximate analysis methods. However, sometimes such ``stable'' cooperation ratios obtained via approximate methods might not be…
This paper investigates discrete-time evolutionary games with a general stochastic imitation rule on the toroidal grid, which is a grid network with periodic boundary conditions. The imitation rule has been considered as a fundamental rule…
We investigate the spatial distribution and the global frequency of agents who can either cooperate or defect. The agent interaction is described by a deterministic, non-iterated prisoner's dilemma game, further each agent only locally…
How coperation between self-interested individuals evolve is a crucial problem, both in biology and in social sciences, that is far from being well understood. Evolutionary game theory is a useful approach to this issue. The simplest model…
This paper is concerned with the death-birth updating process. This model is an example of a spatial game in which players located on the~$d$-dimensional integer lattice are characterized by one of two possible strategies and update their…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…