Related papers: Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborati…
Correlated equilibria enable a coordinator to influence the self-interested agents by recommending actions that no player has an incentive to deviate from. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism relies on accurate knowledge of the…
In this work, we consider dynamic influence maximization games over social networks with multiple players (influencers). The goal of each influencer is to maximize their own reward subject to their limited total budget rate constraints.…
A longstanding idea in the literature on human cooperation is that cooperation should be reinforced when conditional cooperators are more likely to interact. In the context of social networks, this idea implies that cooperation should fare…
In this paper, we develop a recommender system for a game that suggests potential items to players based on their interactive behaviors to maximize revenue for the game provider. Our approach is built on a reinforcement learning-based…
We introduce the component-wise egalitarian Myerson value for network games. This new value being a convex combination of the Myerson value and the component-wise equal division rule is a player-based allocation rule. In network games under…
In competitive resource allocation, a central coordinator may seek to gain an advantage not by directly controlling subordinate agents, but by strategically manipulating the information they receive. We study this problem within the…
We consider a contest game modelling a contest where reviews for $m$ proposals are crowdsourced from $n$ strategic agents} players. Player $i$ has a skill $s_{i\ell}$ for reviewing proposal $\ell$; for her review, she strategically chooses…
Driven by the new economic opportunities created by the creator economy, an increasing number of content creators rely on and compete for revenue generated from online content recommendation platforms. This burgeoning competition reshapes…
We study information design in multi-agent systems (MAS) with binary actions and strategic complementarities, where an external designer influences behavior only through signals. Agents play the smallest-equilibrium of the induced Bayesian…
Handing objects to humans is an essential capability for collaborative robots. Previous research works on human-robot handovers focus on facilitating the performance of the human partner and possibly minimising the physical effort needed to…
Multiagent systems can use commitments as the core of a general coordination infrastructure, supporting both cooperative and non-cooperative interactions. Agents whose objectives are aligned, and where one agent can help another achieve…
Among the various market structures under peer-to-peer energy sharing, one model based on cooperative game theory provides clear incentives for prosumers to collaboratively schedule their energy resources. The computational complexity of…
Incentives for early arrival (I4EA) was recently proposed for studying online cooperative games. In an online cooperative game, players arrive in an unknown order, and the value increase after each player arrived should be distributed…
We consider a variation on the classical finance problem of optimal portfolio design. In our setting, a large population of consumers is drawn from some distribution over risk tolerances, and each consumer must be assigned to a portfolio of…
In this paper, we design gross product maximization mechanisms which incentivize users to upload high-quality contents on user-generated-content (UGC) websites. We show that, the proportional division mechanism, which is widely used in…
In industrial scenarios involving multi-agent collective decision-making, centralized decision-making may not be admissible due to restrictive access to individual local information, while the conflicts between participants' self-interest…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
We propose a framework for two-player infinite-dimensional games with cooperative or competitive structure. These games take the form of coupled partial differential equations in which players optimize over a space of measures, driven by…
According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…