Related papers: PPS: Privacy-Preserving Strategyproof Social-Effic…
We consider a periodic double auction (PDA) setting where buyers of the auction have multiple (but finite) opportunities to procure multiple but fixed units of a commodity. The goal of each buyer participating in such auctions is to reduce…
We study the problem of selling a resource through an auction mechanism. The winning buyer in turn develops this resource to generate profit. Two forms of payment are considered: charging the winning buyer a one-time payment, or an initial…
A digital goods auction is a type of auction where potential buyers bid the maximal price that they are willing to pay for a certain item, which a seller can produce at a negligible cost and in unlimited quantity. To maximise her benefits,…
We consider the classical mathematical economics problem of {\em Bayesian optimal mechanism design} where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known…
Device-to-device (D2D) communication that allows proximity users to communicate directly has been recently proposed to improve spectral efficiency of cellular networks. In this paper, we assume a cellular network consisting of multiple…
We present a new approach to machine learning-powered combinatorial auctions, which is based on the principles of Differential Privacy. Our methodology guarantees that the auction mechanism is truthful, meaning that rational bidders have…
We consider the problem of an auctioneer who faces the task of selling a good (drawn from a known distribution) to a set of buyers, when the auctioneer does not have the capacity to describe to the buyers the exact identity of the good that…
We propose a distributed spectrum access algorithm for cognitive radio relay networks with multiple primary users (PU) and multiple secondary users (SU). The key idea behind the proposed algorithm is that the PUs negotiate with the SUs on…
We consider a resource allocation problem involving a large number of agents with individual constraints subject to privacy, and a central operator whose objective is to optimize a global, possibly nonconvex, cost while satisfying the…
Distributed optimization is manifesting great potential in multiple fields, e.g., machine learning, control, and resource allocation. Existing decentralized optimization algorithms require sharing explicit state information among the…
We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [1] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders and for the public project problem, and in each case social welfare undominated mechanisms in the…
In this paper, a novel spectrum association approach for cognitive radio networks (CRNs) is proposed. Based on a measure of both inference and confidence as well as on a measure of quality-of-service, the association between secondary users…
We study the communication complexity of dominant strategy implementations of combinatorial auctions. We start with two domains that are generally considered "easy": multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal values and combinatorial…
Modern ad auctions allow advertisers to target more specific segments of the user population. Unfortunately, this is not always in the best interest of the ad platform. In this paper, we examine the following basic question in the context…
We study joint spectrum allocation and user association in heterogeneous cellular networks with multiple tiers of base stations. A stochastic geometric approach is applied as the basis to derive the average downlink user data rate in a…
Cloudlet deployment and resource allocation for mobile users (MUs) have been extensively studied in existing works for computation resource scarcity. However, most of them failed to jointly consider the two techniques together, and the…
Motivated by practical concerns in the online advertising industry, we study a bidder subset selection problem in single-item auctions. In this problem, a large pool of candidate bidders have independent values sampled from known prior…
Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally…
In this paper we formulate a contract design problem where a primary license holder wishes to profit from its excess spectrum capacity by selling it to potential secondary users/buyers. It needs to determine how to optimally price the…
This research proposes a novel auction mechanism for transactive energy exchange between buyers and sellers, modeled as agents in a microgrid. The mechanism is implemented by a separate microgrid controller (MC) agent, and requires big data…