Related papers: PPS: Privacy-Preserving Strategyproof Social-Effic…
In the Bidder Selection Problem (BSP) there is a large pool of $n$ potential advertisers competing for ad slots on the user's web page. Due to strict computational restrictions, the advertising platform can run a proper auction only for a…
Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) can effectively improve the spectrum efficiency and alleviate the spectrum scarcity, by allowing unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to access the licensed spectrum of primary users (PUs) opportunistically.…
Generalized Second Price (GSP) auctions are widely used by search engines today to sell their ad slots. Most search engines have supported broad match between queries and bid keywords when executing GSP auctions, however, it has been…
We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multi-dimensional preferences over several possible configurations of the good…
The design of the best economic mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions (SSAs) is a central task in computational mechanism design/game theory. Two open questions concern the adoption of user models more accurate than that one currently…
Strategyproofness in network auctions requires that bidders not only report their valuations truthfully, but also do their best to invite neighbours from the social network. In contrast to canonical auctions, where the value-monotone…
In this paper, we investigate the joint cooperative spectrum sensing and access design problem for multi-channel cognitive radio networks. A general heterogeneous setting is considered where the probabilities that different channels are…
A seller wants to sell an item to $n$ buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in $[a, b]$. To be robust, the seller chooses a DSIC mechanism…
In this paper, we propose new location privacy preserving schemes for database-driven cognitive radio networks that protect secondary users' (SUs) location privacy while allowing them to learn spectrum availability in their vicinity. Our…
Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings. In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a question of major interest. We introduce the study…
It is unrealistic to assume that all nodes in an ad hoc wireless network would be willing to participate in cooperative communication, especially if their desired Quality-of- Service (QoS) is achievable via direct transmission. An…
A privacy-preserving English auction protocol with round efficiency based on a modified ring signature has been proposed in this paper. The proposed protocol has three appealing characteristic: First, it offers conditional…
We consider the problem of cooperative spectrum sharing among a primary user (PU) and multiple secondary users (SUs) under quality of service (QoS) constraints. The SUs network is controlled by the PU through a relay which gets a revenue…
In multi-hop secondary networks, bidding strategies for spectrum auction, route selection and relaying incentives should be jointly considered to establish multi-hop communication. In this paper, a framework for joint resource bidding and…
Cooperative transmission can greatly improve communication system performance by taking advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless channels. Most previous work on resource allocation for cooperation transmission is based on centralized…
This paper investigates the design of access policies in spectrum sharing networks by exploiting the retransmission protocol of legacy primary users (PUs) to improve the spectral efficiency via opportunistic retransmissions at secondary…
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions where the valuation of an agent $i$ for a set $S$ of items can be…
We examine trade-offs among stakeholders in ad auctions. Our metrics are the revenue for the utility of the auctioneer, the number of clicks for the utility of the users and the welfare for the utility of the advertisers. We show how to…
We consider the problem of designing auctions which maximize consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare minus the payments charged to the buyers). In the consumer surplus maximization problem, a seller with a set of goods faces a set of…
Small operators who take part in secondary wireless spectrum markets typically have strict budget limits. In this paper, we study the bidding problem of a budget constrained operator in repeated secondary spectrum auctions. In existing…