Related papers: PS-TRUST: Provably Secure Solution for Truthful Do…
The standard framework of online bidding algorithm design assumes that the seller commits himself to faithfully implementing the rules of the adopted auction. However, the seller may attempt to cheat in execution to increase his revenue if…
This paper studies inference in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with many bidders, using an asymptotic framework where the number of bidders increases while the number of auctions remains fixed. Our approach enables…
A directly public verifiable signcryption scheme is introduced in this paper that provides the security attributes of message confidentiality, authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, unforgeability, and forward secrecy of message…
In this paper, we propose a decentralized, privacy-friendly energy trading platform (PFET) based on game theoretical approach - specifically Stackelberg competition. Unlike existing trading schemes, PFET provides a competitive market in…
We study auction design when a seller relies on machine-learning predictions of bidders' valuations that may be unreliable. Motivated by modern ML systems that are often accurate but occasionally fail in a way that is essentially…
In this paper, we study efficiency in truthful auctions via a social network, where a seller can only spread the information of an auction to the buyers through the buyers' network. In single-item auctions, we show that no mechanism is…
In this work, we investigate online mechanisms for trading time-sensitive valued data. We adopt a continuous function $d(t)$ to represent the data value fluctuation over time $t$. Our objective is to design an \emph{online} mechanism…
We consider the problem of property testing for differential privacy: with black-box access to a purportedly private algorithm, can we verify its privacy guarantees? In particular, we show that any privacy guarantee that can be efficiently…
In this paper, we propose a two-party semiquantum summation protocol, where two classical users can accomplish the summation of their private binary sequences with the assistance of a quantum semi-honest third party (TP). The term…
Trading data through blockchain platforms is hard to achieve \textit{fair exchange}. Reasons come from two folds: Firstly, guaranteeing fairness between sellers and consumers is a challenging task as the deception of any participating…
To address the exponentially increasing data rate demands of end users, necessitates efficient spectrum allocation among co-existing operators in licensed and unlicensed spectrum bands to cater to the temporal and spatial variations of…
We present an algorithm for computing pure-strategy epsilon-perfect Bayesian equilibria in sequential auctions with continuous action and value spaces. Importantly, our algorithm includes a verification phase that computes an upper bound on…
We study signaling in Bayesian ad auctions, in which bidders' valuations depend on a random, unknown state of nature. The auction mechanism has complete knowledge of the actual state of nature, and it can send signals to bidders so as to…
One of the essential security services needed to safeguard online transactions is fair exchange. In fair exchange protocols two parties can exchange their signatures in a fair manner, so that either each party gain the other's signature or…
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP…
Verifiable credentials are a digital analogue of physical credentials. Their authenticity and integrity are protected by means of cryptographic techniques, and they can be presented to verifiers to reveal attributes or even predicates about…
We consider a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, where the sellers run locally independent Progressive Second-Price (PSP) auctions, and buyers may participate in multiple auctions, forming a multi-auction market with perfect…
We are interested in the problem of optimal commitments in rank-and-bid based auctions, a general class of auctions that include first price and all-pay auctions as special cases. Our main contribution is a novel approach to solve for…
We consider a fundamental dynamic allocation problem motivated by the problem of $\textit{securities lending}$ in financial markets, the mechanism underlying the short selling of stocks. A lender would like to distribute a finite number of…
In a technical treatment, this article establishes the necessity of transparent privacy for drawing unbiased statistical inference for a wide range of scientific questions. Transparency is a distinct feature enjoyed by differential privacy:…