Related papers: PS-TRUST: Provably Secure Solution for Truthful Do…
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the…
We introduce a formal framework for analyzing trades in financial markets. An exchange is where multiple buyers and sellers participate to trade. These days, all big exchanges use computer algorithms that implement double sided auctions to…
In the weighted bipartite matching problem, the goal is to find a maximum-weight matching in a bipartite graph with nonnegative edge weights. We consider its online version where the first vertex set is known beforehand, but vertices of the…
Interdependent values make basic auction design tasks -- in particular maximizing welfare truthfully in single-item auctions -- quite challenging. Eden et al. recently established that if the bidders valuation functions are submodular over…
We initiate the study of markets for private data, though the lens of differential privacy. Although the purchase and sale of private data has already begun on a large scale, a theory of privacy as a commodity is missing. In this paper, we…
We consider the fundamental problem of designing a truthful single-item auction with the challenging objective of extracting a large fraction of the highest agent valuation as revenue. Following a recent trend in algorithm design, we assume…
Sign-Perturbed Sums (SPS) is a system identification method that constructs confidence regions for the unknown system parameters. In this paper, we study SPS for ARX systems, and establish that the confidence regions are guaranteed to…
We present an extensive analysis of the key problem of learning optimal reserve prices for generalized second price auctions. We describe two algorithms for this task: one based on density estimation, and a novel algorithm benefiting from…
For population studies or for the training of complex machine learning models, it is often required to gather data from different actors. In these applications, summation is an important primitive: for computing means, counts or mini-batch…
A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with strategic agents. As achieving the full GFT is generally impossible, much of the…
A Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PVSS) scheme allows anyone to verify the validity of the shares computed and distributed by a dealer. The idea of PVSS was introduced by Stadler in [18] where he presented a PVSS scheme based on…
When multiple parties that deal with private data aim for a collaborative prediction task such as medical image classification, they are often constrained by data protection regulations and lack of trust among collaborating parties. If done…
We study a single-buyer pricing problem with unreliable side information, motivated by the increasing use of AI-assisted decision-making and LLM-based predictions. The seller observes a private sample that may be either accurate (coinciding…
We study the problem of subspace tracking in the presence of missing data (ST-miss). In recent work, we studied a related problem called robust ST. In this work, we show that a simple modification of our robust ST solution also provably…
This paper studies some basic problems in a multiple-object auction model using methodologies from theoretical computer science. We are especially concerned with situations where an adversary bidder knows the bidding algorithms of all the…
Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit,…
Sealed-bid auctions play a crucial role in blockchain ecosystems. Previous works introduced viable blockchain sealed-bid auction protocols, leveraging timed commitments for bid encryption. However, a crucial challenge remains unresolved in…
We study the robust double auction mechanisms, that is, the double auction mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality and ex-post budget balance. We first establish that the price in…
Consensus algorithms play a critical role in blockchains and directly impact their performance. During consensus processing, nodes need to validate and order the pending transactions into a new block, which requires verifying the…
Securing the traceability of products in the supply chain is an urgent issue. Recently, supply chain systems that use public blockchain (PBC) have been proposed. In these systems, PBC is used as a common database shared between supply chain…