Related papers: Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution under Unc…
This work addresses the optimal covariance control problem for stochastic discrete-time linear time-varying systems subject to chance constraints. Covariance steering is a stochastic control problem to steer the system state Gaussian…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…
We consider stochastic model predictive control of a multi-agent systems with constraints on the probabilities of inter-agent collisions. We first study a sample-based approximation of the collision probabilities and use this approximation…
In this paper, a general stochastic model with controls applied at the moments when the random process hits the boundary of a given subset of the state set is proposed and studied. The general concept of the model is formulated and its…
This paper discusses the role of opportunistic punisher who may act selfishly to free-ride cooperators or not to be exploited by defectors. To consider opportunistic punisher, we make a change to the sequence of one-shot public good game;…
In this article we study an optimal control problem subject to the Fokker-Planck equation \[ \partial_t \rho - \nu \Delta \rho - {\rm div } \big(\rho B[u]\big) = 0. \] The control variable $u$ is time-dependent and possibly…
In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…
Self-stabilization is an excellent approach for adding fault tolerance to a distributed multi-agent system. However, two properties of self-stabilization theory, convergence and closure, may not be satisfied if agents are selfish. To…
In this paper, we continue our study on a general time-inconsistent stochastic linear--quadratic (LQ) control problem originally formulated in [6]. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium controls via a flow of…
We study a general class of Principal-Agent problems in continuous time under hidden action. By formulating the model as a coupled stochastic optimal control problem we are able to find a set of necessary conditions characterizing optimal…
In this work we study of competitive situations among users of a set of global resources. More precisely we study the effect of cost policies used by these resources in the convergence time to a pure Nash equilibrium. The work is divided in…
We introduce a method based on the Public Goods Game for solving optimization tasks. In particular, we focus on the Traveling Salesman Problem, i.e. a NP-hard problem whose search space exponentially grows increasing the number of cities.…
A new stochastic control problem of population dynamics under partial observation is formulated and analyzed both mathematically and numerically, with an emphasis on environmental and ecological problems. The decision-maker can only…
Players allocate their budget to links, a local public good and a private good. A player links to free ride on others' public good provision. We derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium, large…
We consider a stochastic control problem where the set of strict (classical) controls is not necessarily convex, and the system is governed by a nonlinear backward stochastic differential equation. By introducing a new approach, we…
A game-theoretic framework for time-inconsistent stopping problems where the time-inconsistency is due to the consideration of a non-linear function of an expected reward is developed. A class of mixed strategy stopping times that allows…
We study the time-inconsistent linear quadratic optimal control problem for forward-backward stochastic differential equations with potentially indefinite cost weighting matrices for both the state and the control variables. Our research…
We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzon (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their…
We study the design of decision-making mechanism for resource allocations over a multi-agent system in a dynamic environment. Agents' privately observed preference over resources evolves over time and the population is dynamic due to the…
We consider a continuous time stochastic dynamic game between a stopper (Player $1$, the \textit{owner} of an asset yielding an income) and a controller (Player $2$, the \textit{manager} of the asset), where the manager is either effective…