Related papers: Shapley Meets Shapley
Additive feature explanations using Shapley values have become popular for providing transparency into the relative importance of each feature to an individual prediction of a machine learning model. While Shapley values provide a unique…
Shapley values have emerged as a central game-theoretic tool in explainable AI (XAI). However, computing Shapley values exactly requires $2^d$ game evaluations for a model with $d$ features. Lundberg and Lee's KernelSHAP algorithm has…
Variable selection or importance measurement of input variables to a machine learning model has become the focus of much research. It is no longer enough to have a good model, one also must explain its decisions. This is why there are so…
The Shapley value, a solution concept from cooperative game theory, has recently been considered for both unrooted and rooted phylogenetic trees. Here, we focus on the Shapley value of unrooted trees and first revisit the so-called split…
The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik \cite{Shapley1971assignment} characterized the core of the assignment game using ideas from matching theory and LP-duality theory and their highly non-trivial interplay. Whereas the core of this game…
Following the original interpretation of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a) as a priori evaluation of the prospects of a player in a multi-person interaction situation, we propose a group value, which we call the Shapley group value, as a…
In cooperative game theory, the primary focus is the equitable allocation of payoffs or costs among agents. However, in the practical applications of cooperative games, accurately representing games is challenging. In such cases, using an…
One of the long-debated issues in coalitional game theory is how to extend the Shapley value to games with externalities (partition-function games). When externalities are present, not only can a player's marginal contribution - a central…
According to Shapley's game-theoretical result, there exists a unique game value of finite cooperative games that satisfies axioms on additivity, efficiency, null-player property and symmetry. The original setting requires symmetry with…
Cooperative game theory has become a cornerstone of post-hoc interpretability in machine learning, largely through the use of Shapley values. Yet, despite their widespread adoption, Shapley-based methods often rest on axiomatic…
The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A…
In this manuscript, we define and study probabilistic values for cooperative games on simplicial complexes. Inspired by the work of Weber "Probabilistic values for games", we establish the new theory step by step, following the classical…
Cooperative game theory methods, notably Shapley values, have significantly enhanced machine learning (ML) interpretability. However, existing explainable AI (XAI) frameworks mainly attribute average model predictions, overlooking…
We consider some well-known families of two-player, zero-sum, perfect information games that can be viewed as special cases of Shapley's stochastic games. We show that the following tasks are polynomial time equivalent: - Solving simple…
Myerson first introduced graph-restricted games in order to model the interaction of cooperative players with an underlying communication network. A dedicated solution concept -- the Myerson value -- is perhaps the most important normative…
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
The presence of artificial intelligence (AI) in our society is increasing, which brings with it the need to understand the behavior of AI mechanisms, including machine learning predictive algorithms fed with tabular data, text or images,…
The Shapley value (SV) and Least core (LC) are classic methods in cooperative game theory for cost/profit sharing problems. Both methods have recently been proposed as a principled solution for data valuation tasks, i.e., quantifying the…
Model interpretability is one of the most intriguing problems in most of the Machine Learning models, particularly for those that are mathematically sophisticated. Computing Shapley Values are arguably the best approach so far to find the…
Measuring individual productivity (or equivalently distributing the overall productivity) in a network structure of workers displaying peer effects has been a subject of ongoing interest in many areas ranging from academia to industry. In…